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Summary
The overall objective of this paper is to outline the
analytical framework and theoretical approach
underlying a new research paradigm and illustrate
how this paradigm can be used for the strategic
analysis of water institutions by applying it to the
Indian context. The specific objectives are to:
(a) outline the analytical framework and theoreti-
cal approach underlying a new research
paradigm needed for a strategic analysis of
water institutions including their internal
structure and external environment
(b) review the evolution, structure, and perfor-
mance of water-related institutional arrange-
ments in India, focusing first on the macro/
formal institutional arrangements and then, on
their micro/informal counterparts
(c) assess the performance of water institutions
using a few objective criteria
(d) evaluate the recent institutional changes
within an institutional transaction cost frame-
work and identify the forces—both endog-
enous and exogenous to the water sector—
that determine the depth and direction of
water institutional changes in the country
(e) conclude by identifying some major implica-
tions for theory and policy in the realm of
water institutional reform
In focus and scope, this paper is more
eclectic rather than exhaustive in terms of its
coverage because it focuses mainly on the most
important aspects of water institutions that are
receiving attention in current debates on water
sector reforms both in India and elsewhere. While
informal institutional arrangements operating at
the micro level will receive attention, the major
focus will be on the formal institutional arrange-
ments that are operating at the national and
regional levels.
The analytical approach and theoretical
framework of the research paradigm is based on
two aspects, i.e., the institutional decomposition
and analysis (IDA) framework and the institutional
transaction cost theory that generalizes the
transaction cost theory developed originally by
Coase and Williamson. The IDA framework
provides the foundation for a systematic review of
water institutions. This framework is based on a
two-stage decomposition of water institutions.
First, water institutions are decomposed to
delineate the water institutional environment
(governance framework)—as determined by the
historical, constitutional, economic, social, politi-
cal, and physical conditions of the country—from
the water institutional structure (governance
structure)—as determined by water-related law,
policy, and organizational elements. And, second,
water institutional structure is decomposed into
water law, water policy, and water organization or
administration and each of these institutional
components are decomposed further to highlight a
few of the most important institutional aspects.
In the water-law component, the institutional
aspects receiving attention are: inter-governmental
responsibility, water rights, and accountability. In
the water-policy component, the institutional
aspects getting coverage are: national water
policy, project-selection criteria, water pricing and
cost-recovery policies, and user participation and
privatization initiatives. In the water organization
component, the institutional aspects considered
are: organizational framework, financing and
management responsibilities, regulatory arrange-
ments, and conflict resolution mechanisms. Tovi
complete the analysis of the water institutional
structure, informal/micro water institutions, such
as localized institutions, rental markets for irriga-
tion assets, groundwater markets, and water-
based contract and conventions are also re-
viewed.
Having discussed the approaches that are
possible for directly evaluating water institutional
performance, the paper, then, identifies and uses
an approach for indirectly evaluating water institu-
tional performance via water sector performance.
This approach is based on three gaps: the
physical gap (gap between water resource poten-
tial and its utilization as well as the gap between
water demand and supply), financial gap (gap
between water sector investment and cost recov-
ery), and economic/incentive gap (gap between
the average value of water and the water rate
being charged). Using some objective information
on these criteria, the paper evaluates water
institutional performance indirectly in terms of the
performance of the water sector (especially, its
irrigation sub-sector). The next section documents
the nature, extent, and direction of recent water
institutional changes both at the national and
regional level. Using the institutional transaction
cost framework, the paper also attempts to
explain the factors behind ongoing institutional
changes.
The reform initiatives, undertaken especially
since 1991, provide observational evidence for the
fact that reform benefits (or, the opportunity costs
of inaction) are exceeding the corresponding
economic and political transaction costs. But, the
fact that the institutional changes are uniform
neither across institutional components nor across
water sub-sectors suggests that both the opportu-
nity and transaction costs vary considerably by
institutional and sectoral contexts. The reform
process also provides clear evidence for the
powerful effects that exogenous factors (e.g.,
economic liberalization policies, political forces,
international financial and research institutions,
and natural calamities) have on the opportunity
and transaction costs of institutional change within
the water sector. While India has to go a long
way to set right its water institutional structure,
from the perspective of a stage-based process of
institutional change, the changes observed so far
do signify that India is on the threshold of enter-
ing the substantive and irreversible phase of
institutional reform. As the already initiated
reforms begin to yield benefits, strengthen pro-
reform constituencies, and reduce the technical
and political costs of transacting additional re-
forms, the incentive balance within the institutional
transaction cost framework is likely to move
toward further reforms.1
Unfortunately, most water institutions—being
developed in an era of water surplus, especially
during the colonial period—are becoming
increasingly ineffective in addressing water
challenges as the country enters an era of
absolute water scarcity. Indian water institutions
have undergone significant changes in recent
years. However, these changes fall far short of
the new and emerging institutional requirements
of the water sector. To see the magnitude and
consequences of this reform gap, we need to
first review the water institutional structure and
then, attempt an evaluation of its efficacy and
performance. The review of both the water
institutional structure and the evaluation of its
performance can be more illuminating when it is
based on a conceptual and analytical framework
based on the institutional decomposition
approach. Similarly, the nature and direction of
the recent institutional changes, and the factors
leading to these changes can be understood
better within a theoretical framework based on
the institutional transaction cost approach that
accounts for the role of both economic and
political factors.
Strategic Analysis of Water Institutions in India:
Application of a New Research Paradigm
R. Maria Saleth
Introduction
With increasing water scarcity and frequent
occurrences of water-related conflicts at macro
and micro levels, the institutional arrangements
governing water resource development,
allocation, and management are receiving
increasing policy attention worldwide. The water
institutional arrangements assume, however, an
enhanced significance in India as the country is
moving fast towards the ultimate limit of its
utilizable water resource potential. Although India
is using only about 57 percent of its total water
resource potential at present, it is already using
about 66 percent of its irrigation potential
(MOWR 2000). While water demand is increasing
fast with a growing population and an expanding
economy, further development of water resources
is seriously constrained by investment
bottlenecks, environmental concerns, and political
and legal snags inherent in inter-regional water
transfers. As the gap between projected demand
and potential supply is likely to grow further, the
physical scarcity of water, which is already visible
in a few regions and cities, is expected to
assume national proportions in the not-too-distant
future.2
The overall objective of this paper is to outline
the analytical framework and theoretical approach
underlying a new research paradigm and
illustrate how this paradigm can be used for the
strategic analysis of water institutions—with
application in the Indian context. This paper
attempts to realize its overall objective by
addressing the following specific objectives:
(a) outline the analytical framework and
theoretical approach underlying a new
research paradigm needed for a strategic
analysis of water institutions including their
internal structure and external environment
(b) review the evolution, structure, and
performance of water institutional
arrangements, focusing first on the macro/
formal institutional arrangements and then,
on their micro/informal counterparts
(c) assess the performance of water institutions
using some objective criteria
(d) evaluate the recent institutional changes
within an institutional transaction cost
framework and identify the forces—both
endogenous and exogenous to the water
sector—that determine the depth and
direction of water institutional changes
(e) conclude by identifying some major
implications for theory and policy in the realm
of water institutional reforms
In focus and scope, this paper is more
eclectic rather than exhaustive in terms of its
coverage of the legal, policy, and administrative
or organizational aspects governing the water
sector. The emphasis will be on the most
important aspects of water institutions that are
receiving considerable attention in the current
debate on water sector reforms both in India and
elsewhere. Such a selective coverage is
necessary partly due to the need for a more
focused analysis and partly due to the
continental nature of India having a wider
regional diversity in terms of both water
institutional arrangements and water sector
features. Nevertheless, as much as possible,
region-specific aspects of both water institutional
arrangements as well as water sector features
will be highlighted in all relevant contexts. While
informal institutions operating at the micro level
will receive attention, the major focus will be on
the formal institutional arrangements that are
operating at the national and regional levels.
1
This is because formal and macro-level
institutions are more amenable for purposive
reforms than their informal and micro-level
counterparts.
Objectives and Scope
1As we know, in the case of water institutional arrangement in countries such as India, the formal/macro level institutions are related mostly
to canal-based surface irrigation systems, whereas most of the informal/micro level institutions are mainly associated with groundwater and
tank irrigation irrigation systems. Also, there are formal institutions governing urban and rural water supply and water quality. While the formal/
macro institutions, especially those related to the irrigation sector, cover most part of the water institutional arrangements in India, our major
focus on them does not mean that the approaches proposed here do not have a generic application to all the remaining institutions—both at
the micro and macro levels.3
The research paradigm that we propose for the
strategic analysis of water institutions is centered
on two complementary analytical and theoretical
components, i.e., ‘Institutional Decomposition and
Analysis’ (IDA) framework and the ‘Institutional
Transaction Cost’ theory that are recently
developed by Saleth and Dinar (forthcoming).
Before indicating how this research paradigm can
allow us to have a strategic analysis of water
institutions as well as the factors contributing to
their evolution and change. Its underlying
analytical and theoretical components are
described first.
Institutions are entities defined by a
configuration of legal, policy, and organizational
rules, conventions, and practices that are
structurally linked and operationally embedded
within a well-specified environment. A simple
analytical decomposition can enable us to have a
better understanding of their innate nature and
inherent features. Institutional decomposition can
be attempted at different levels and detail. From
a very broad perspective, institutions can be
decomposed by distinguishing the institutional
structure (or, governance structure) from its
institutional environment (or, governance
framework) (Williamson 1975; North 1990a).
While the institutional environment is
characterized by the overall physical, cultural,
historic, socio-economic, and political milieu of a
country or region, the institutional structure is
defined by the interactive effects of the legal,
policy, and organizational or administrative
components and their constituent aspects. Since
the institutional structure is embedded within the
institutional environment, the evolution of the
former is invariably conditioned by changes in the
latter. This does not mean that there is only a
one-way flow of effects between the two, as
changing the institutional structure also influences
the institutional environment or governance
framework.
Like all other institutions, water institutions
too have their own institutional structure as well
as their institutional environment (Saleth and
Dinar 1999 and 2004). The water institutional
environment is characterized not only by the
factors determining the overall institutional
environment but also by those related to water
resource conditions as well as to other water-
related sectors such as agriculture, environment
and forest, and urban development. The water
institutional structure is defined interactively by
three institutional components, i.e., water law,
water policy, and water administration (or, water-
related organizations). As such, the water
institutional structure can be broadly decomposed
into these three interrelated components.
2 It
should be noted that the institutional components
cover not only the formal and macro-level
arrangements but also the informal and micro
level arrangements such as those reflected in
local customs, conventions, and informal
contracts.
The formal institutional components (and, to
some extent, their informal counterparts) can
also be decomposed further to highlight some of
their major institutional aspects (Saleth and Dinar
1999 and 2004). For instance, water law can be
decomposed to highlight: (a) inter-governmental
Analytical Framework
2Such decomposition is not arbitrary. It has a strong theoretical basis and analytical similarity with the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD framework developed by Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994). This framework characterizes institutions in terms of
three hierarchically related categories of rules: constitutional-choice rules, collective-choice rules, and operational rules. As we take a deeper
look at these categories of rules, it will become apparent that they can be approximated respectively by laws (legal rules), policies (policy
guidelines), and organizations (organizational rules). For, laws are the outcome of constitutional choice and policies are the results of a collective
choice through the political process whereas the operational rules come into play when the laws and policies are operationalized by the
administrative mechanisms involved in their implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.4
responsibility, (b) water rights, and (c)
accountability provisions and mechanisms.
Similarly, water policy can be decomposed to
shed light on: (a) project selection criteria, (b)
pricing and cost recovery, and (c) user and
private sector participation policy. In the same
way, the organizational dimension of water
institutions can be decomposed to focus on: (a)
organizational structure and the relative role of
government layers, (b) financing and
management, (c) regulatory mechanisms, and (d)
conflict resolution arrangements. It is this kind of
institutional decomposition that will be used as
the analytical framework for organizing the review
and description of the water institutional structure
in India.
3
Three critical features of this analytical
framework need to be noted. First, although it is
not that detailed and exhaustive, it still captures
most of the institutional issues that are currently
receiving major attention both in national and
global policy debates. Second, the decomposed
institutional components and their constituent
aspects are treated as independent entities only
for analytical convenience. In reality, the
institutional aspects are functionally nested and
interlinked both within and across the institutional
components.
4 In this sense, the decomposition
exercise enables us to trace the linkages among
institutional components and institutional aspects
and this tracing procedure can, in turn, allow us
to understand how these institutional linkages
function as a medium for transmitting a change
in one institutional component or aspects to their
counterparts.
5 As we will see later, due to their
role in facilitating institutional change
downstream, these institutional linkages also
have significant implications for the overall
transaction costs of institutional change. Finally,
as the institutional decomposition proceeds to
minute levels, i.e., beyond the institutional
aspects, the exercise can identify the
configurations of rules underlying each of these
institutional aspects. However, in view of the
obvious reasons of simplicity, we are not going
for such a minute level of decomposition here.
The theoretical framework that used here for
explaining water institutional evolution and
change is based on the institutional transaction
cost theory originally developed by Coase (1937),
Williamson (1975), and North (1990b). While a
simple but more general representation of this
theory, as applicable to the particular context of
water sector, can be found in Saleth and Dinar
(2000 and 2004), here, we provide a brief
description. In simple terms, the institutional
transaction cost framework first identifies all the
major factors affecting water institutions and
then, traces their effects either on the transaction
or opportunity costs of institutional reform. While
the factors influencing water institutions are many
and diverse, for analytical convenience, they can
be grouped into endogenous factors that are
internal to both water institutions and the water
3To distinguish this framework, which is applicable mainly at the macro institutional level, from the IAD framework of Ostrom and co-workers,
which is applicable at the micro institutions, it is called IDA framework by Saleth and Dinar (2004).
4For instance, within the water law component, the aspects of water rights, conflict resolution, and accountability are interrelated as do the
aspects of pricing, cost recovery, and user and private participation within the water policy component. Notice also that water policy is a
political translation of water law (or, water law is a legal representation of the policies, which have gained political consensus or withstood the
test of time) and water administration is the implementation arm for both water law and water policy. As such, these three institutional components
are themselves nested and linked both organically and operationally.
5To illustrate how institutional linkages function as a vehicle for conveying changes across institutional components/aspects, let us consider
the case of irrigation management transfer. Although irrigation management transfer is an organizational change (from state management to
farmer management), it has a favorable effect on policy dimensions such as water pricing and cost recovery. Organizational change can also
pave the way for higher level technical and institutional changes such as the introduction of volumetric allocation procedure and the establishment
of a water rights system. That is, the organizational change can be much more effective if it is coupled with corresponding changes in the
legal and technical dimensions. Thus, institutional linkages play a key role in determining both the individual and joint performance of water
institutional components and aspects.5
sector and exogenous factors that are outside
the strict confines of both water institutions and
the water sector. In broad terms, these
endogenous and exogenous factors can be
considered to capture the key features of the
institutional structure and the institutional
environment, respectively. However, there is an
exception. For analytical convenience and on
practical considerations, the physical and
ecological features of the water sector, which are
actually the components of the water institutional
environment in a strict theoretical sense, are
considered here as endogenous and not as
exogenous factors.
6
The endogenous factors include water
scarcity, water conflicts, financial and physical
deterioration of water infrastructure, and
operational inefficiency of water institutions.
Another very important endogenous factor that is
often overlooked or underestimated in most
institutional analysis pertains to the internal
linkages among water institutional components
and aspects. These institutional linkages have
implications not only for institutional performance
but also for the overall transaction costs of
institutional change itself.
7 The IDA framework, as
described in the previous section, provides a
mechanism for incorporating the performance
and transaction cost implications of institutional
linkages within the formal context of the
institutional transaction cost theory. The
exogenous factors, on the other hand, represent
the general aspects such as economic
development, demographic growth, technical
progress, economic and political reforms,
international commitments and pressures,
changing social values and ethos, and natural
phenomena such as floods and droughts.
8 Thus,
the exogenous factors represent the overall
institutional environment facing water institutions
whereas the endogenous factors reflect the
internal features of water institutions and the
water sector in a given context and point in time.
Understandably, it is the interactive and joint
effects of these endogenous and exogenous
factors that will determine the structure,
performance, and change in the water sector and
its institutional arrangements.
Although it is difficult to isolate the individual
effects of the exogenous and endogenous
factors, it is still possible to track them,
especially by conceptualizing their effects either
in terms of the transaction costs or in terms of
the opportunity costs. The transaction costs
cover both the real and monetary costs of
instituting and changing the legal, policy,
regulatory, monitoring, and enforcement
mechanisms related to water development,
allocation, utilization, and management. The
opportunity costs, on the other hand, cover both
the real and economic value of opportunities
foregone (i.e., the net social costs of inaction or
‘status quo’). In this sense, the opportunity costs
are actually the potential benefits of the
6This exception allows us to distinguish the physical aspects of the water sector from other exogenous factors that are operating outside the
strict confines of the water sector and its institutional arrangements. Although the physical aspects of the water sector are included with other
endogenous features of water institutional structure, their interaction will be still very much a part of our analysis. The water sector features,
ranging from the degree of water scarcity to the physical layout of the water supply systems, have a fundamental impact on water institutional
performance. For instance, in his comparative study of south Indian and Korean water control institutions, Wade (1982 and 1985) has shown
that the physical and ecological setting of water systems plays a powerful role in determining institutional performance.
7For instance, a legally and organizationally mature user organization tends to minimize the cost of establishing volumetric allocation, which,
in turn, can pave the way for the eventual development of a water quota system including some decentralized arrangements for conflict
resolution and accountability. Needless to add, since these local level arrangements tend to reinforce the macro level conflict resolution and
accountability mechanisms, there will be mutual synergy among these institutional arrangements creating the necessary conditions for improved
institutional performance.
8Notice that it is these exogenous factors that together, in fact, define the overall institutional environment for the water institutional structure.
As such, our analytical framework captures also the transaction cost implications of changing institutional environment as characterized by
both economic and non-economic factors.6
institutional change. That is, when the
institutional change cannot be effected, these
benefits are reckoned as social costs in terms of
the opportunities (or, benefits) sacrificed or
foregone to maintain the status quo. The
institutional transaction cost theory predicts that
institutional change occurs whenever the
opportunity costs exceed the transaction costs so
as to give the much needed political economy
thrust for reform.
The opportunity and transactions costs of
institutional changes are not static but change
continuously due to changes in factors both
endogenous and exogenous to the water sector.
For instance, as water scarcity becomes acute
due to economic development and population
growth, the real and economic costs of
inappropriate water institutions tend to rise.
Similarly, the economic reforms magnify the fiscal
implications whereas natural calamities such as
droughts and floods aggravate the political
implications of the opportunity costs of
institutional reforms. Political reforms involving
nation-wide institutional changes, on the other
hand, reduce the transaction costs of water
sector reforms directly because the institutional
changes within the water sector form only a
small part of the overall reform process.
Likewise, technical progress can also reduce the
transaction costs of institutional changes. As the
exogenous factors tend to magnify the
opportunity costs of the water crisis and reduce
the transaction costs of water sector reforms,
they often provide a powerful economic urge and
political thrust for water institutional changes.
We can also clarify two additional aspects to
dispel any possible confusion or
misunderstanding as to the nature of the
transaction and opportunity costs as well as the
issue of how and by whom they are reckoned.
First, these costs can be reckoned ex-post, i.e.,
after having observed the actual impacts of
institutional change. But, such a post mortem
analysis, though providing considerable insights
into the relative role of the factors that led to the
institutional change, is of little value for providing
predictive inputs into an ongoing and future
process of institutional change. What is more
relevant here is the ex-ante evaluation of the
transaction and opportunity costs by various
stakeholder groups. Such an ex-ante evaluation
necessarily involves subjective elements
including a subjective and adaptive evaluation of
even objective factors. Subjective and ex-ante
reckoning of these costs are, in fact, inevitable
in view of the dynamic and inter-disciplinary
nature of institutional changes, lacking both
observed data as well as an unified and trans-
disciplinary framework needed to integrate and
process diverse information (Saleth and Dinar
2004). And, second, the transaction and
opportunity costs are reckoned not just by the
state but equally also by the communities,
groups, and individuals. It is the convergence in
the transaction cost calculus of the majority or
the most powerful groups that determines the
nature and depth of institutional changes both at
the macro and micro levels.
9
Institutional change is not a one-time event
but rather a continuum involving gradual
changes over time in response to the changing
dynamics and relative magnitude and distribution
of reform costs and benefits. As the reforms
initiated in earlier stages brighten the prospects
for downstream reforms, there are intricate
linkages between the transaction costs of
9To explain how such convergence occurs and how it leads to institutional change, Saleth and Dinar (2004) have proposed a subjective and
stage-based theory of institutional change. According to this theory, institutional change occurs through four stages: mind change of stakeholders
(as induced by subjective and objective evaluation of existing and future state of affairs), political articulation of such change (due to the role
of political entrepreneurs), policy changes and actual implementation (through the process of interest group politics and political bargaining),
and performance improvement (as measured against objective criteria and subject expectation of stakeholders). These stages are not linear
but cyclical because when performance improvement is below expectation, the process will again go through the four stages. Depending on
country or regional context, the time dimension and quality of the process at each stage can be different.7
subsequent reforms and the opportunity costs of
earlier reforms.
10 Similarly, since the institutional
changes within the water sector derive
considerable synergy from exogenous factors
that reflect changes elsewhere in the economy,
the transaction costs of water sector reforms can
also decline due to scale economies in
institutional change.
11 The opportunity and
transaction cost implications of these dynamic
and internal features of institutional linkages and
reform sequencing are an important and inherent
part of the institutional transaction cost theory
(Saleth and Dinar 2004).
The institutional transaction cost theory, as
outlined above, captures not only the role of
factors both within and outside the water sector
but also the strategic significance of certain
dynamic aspects of institutional change such as
institutional linkages and scale economies (Saleth
and Dinar 2004). Since it provides a unified
framework to track and account for the effects of
various factors affecting institutional changes in
the water sector, this theory can indeed be used
to explain both country-specific and cross-country
variations in the nature and direction of water
institutional changes. While the set of factors
affecting water institutional change does not vary
much across countries/regions/sectors, their
relative role and significance in the opportunity-
cost transaction cost calculus can vary
considerably across countries/regions/sectors. It
is the contextual nature of these variations that,
in fact, explains why countries/regions/sectors
differ in terms of the extent and depth of water
institutional reform observed both in the past and
at present (Saleth and Dinar 2000). It is for
reasons such as these that we consider the
institutional transaction cost theory as an
appropriate theoretical framework for a strategic
analysis of water institutions. The strategic
significance of this framework lies in the fact that
it enables us to exploit the performance and
transaction implications of favorable institutional
features (e.g., institutional linkages and path
dependency) and institutional environment (e.g.,
political and macro-economic reforms, droughts,
and international agreements) promote water
sector reforms.
10For instance, with the establishment of a transferable water rights system, the creation of other institutional aspects such as the conflict
resolution mechanisms and water markets becomes easier due to the linkages that the transactions costs of the latter two institutional aspects
have with those of the former.
11The scale economies in transaction costs emerge from the fact that the cost of transacting water institutional changes is lower when water
sector reform forms part of an overall country-wide economic reform (e.g., China) and political reconstruction (e.g., South Africa) than otherwise
(Saleth and Dinar 2000).
Water Institutional Environment: An Overview
The institutional environment of water institutions
in India can be characterized in terms of a
synoptic overview of the country’s history,
constitutional framework, socioeconomic
conditions, political arrangements, and finally, the
physical setting of the water sector itself. India is
known for a long history and rich cultural
traditions. Its present administrative and judicial
systems have evolved through a long process
involving a strong central Asian and Persian
influence during the Mogul period and British
influence during the colonial period. It is,
however, the British who improved and perfected
these diverse systems into a relatively uniform
but centralized administrative and judicial system.
With the consolidation of a centralized
government bureaucracy and the spread of
markets and commercialization, local and8
community-centered institutions have lost their
relevance and gradually disappeared. The British
influence can also be seen in the Indian political
system characterized by multi-party democracy
based on the parliamentary system. India has a
federal form of government operating with a
modern constitution that demarcates the
responsibilities of the central, state, and local
governments.
12
India covers an area 3.29 million km
2 and
has a population of over a billion. Despite the
constraints and burdens imposed by heavy
demographic pressure, the Indian economy is
able to grow annually by around 6 percent with a
current per capita income of US$ 450.
13
Comparing the pre-Independence situation with
the present, India has displayed remarkable
economic performance with the achievement of
food self-sufficiency since the early 1970s and
also self-reliance in most industrial products
since the early 1980s. But, India is still largely a
rural economy as two-thirds of the population still
live in rural areas, though the rural areas
themselves have undergone remarkable
transformation in recent years, thanks to the
expansion of transport and communication
facilities. Although the share of agriculture in the
gross domestic product has declined now to 30
percent, this sector is critical both as a major
source of employment (70 percent share in total
employment) and as a key predicator of the pace
and tempo of the overall macro-economic
performance itself. Rural poverty, which used to
be as high as 56 percent during 1973-1974, has
declined to 41 percent during 1984-1985
(Planning Commission 1993:37-40). In recent
years, this figure hovers around 33 percent (see
Saleth, Samad and Namara 2003).
Understandably, the water economy plays a
critical role in the overall structure of the Indian
economy. Being a vast and monsoon-dependent
country, water resources availability in India
displays a wide variation across time and
space.
14 From an overall perspective, the total
water resource potential of the country is
estimated to be about 1,953 billion m
3 of which
only 1122 billion m
3 can be utilized under current
economic and technological conditions. But, the
actually developed water resources—from both
surface and groundwater sources—at present is
only about 644 billion m
3 representing 57 percent
of the utilizable potential. But, the total water
requirement of the country is projected to be in
the range of 694-710 billion m
3 by the year 2010,
784-850 billion m
3 by the year 2025, and 973-
1180 billion m
3 by the year 2050 (MOWR,
2000).
15 Such an increasing supply-demand gap,
especially in the face of economic growth and
demographic expansion, leads to a continuous
decline in per capita water availability. For
instance, the per capita water availability, which
was about 5,277 m
3 in 1955, has declined to
about 1970 m
3 at present (MOWR 2000).
Although non-irrigation demand is likely to
quadruple, the essentially rural and agricultural
basis of the Indian economy will continue to
orient the water sector towards its irrigation sub-
sector.
One key feature with considerable
institutional implications is the administrative
demarcation of different water sub-sectors. While
the canal irrigation sector is developed and
12Although the central government is strong as per the constitution, the state governments are becoming politically powerful in recent years
due to the growing influence of regional parties both in state assemblies and in the national parliament.
13When evaluated in terms of purchasing power parity, this per capita income is equivalent to about $2,150 (see World Bank 2000, 274).
14For instance, the average annual precipitation varies from 130 mm in the Rajasthan desert to 11,000 mm—the world’s highest rainfall—in
the Assam Mountains. Notably, a three-fourth of rainfall in India is received just in four months during June-September.
15These estimates are based on assumptions concerning projected population growth, agricultural needs and urbanization. Given data limitations
and uncertainty, there is no way for checking whether these assumptions are realistic and hence, whether the figures are reliable. But, the
fact remains that future water needs of the country are going to increase much more rapidly than the ability to augment water supply.9
managed by public agencies, groundwater
irrigation is developed and managed by millions
of independent farmers.
16 Groundwater irrigation
is made possible by 9.8 million electric and 4.4
million diesel pumpsets that are fitted with some
5 million shallow/deep tubewells—located mainly
in the Indo-Gangetic and deltaic regions—and 10
million dugwells—spread essentially in the
hardrock region covering western and peninsular
India. Besides, there are about 0.17 million
surface water-based lifts located mostly in the
deltaic regions of West Bengal and Orissa. On
the other hand, water supply in urban and rural
areas is largely managed by semi-autonomous
water supply undertakings, municipalities and
local governments. Households rely on their own
water supply developed from groundwater
sources both in urban and rural areas. Finally,
institutions related to other resources involved in
water resource development and utilization as
well as those related to general economic and
sectoral management also form part of the water
institutional environment. These include the land,
forest, and agriculture-related institutions (e.g.,
land tenure and tenancy, inheritance laws, and
forest and environment acts, agricultural pricing
policies, and trade policies and international
agreements).
16However, groundwater development is supported by the government both directly in the form of public or state tubewells as well as indirectly
in the form of credit support and massive investment in rural electrification programs.
17For more details on this framework, see Saleth and Dinar (2004).
18For a detailed review of irrigation acts and other water-related legal provisions, see the works of Jacob and Singh (1972), Jacob and Mahesh
(1976), and Singh (1991 and 1992). While Jacob and Singh (1972) and Jacob and Mahesh (1976) present a well conceived proposal for the
unification and simplification of irrigation acts, Singh (1991 and 1992) argues for the creation of an exclusive but broad domain of water law
by bringing together various water-related constitutional, civil, and criminal provisions. Unfortunately, these proposals have not yet received
their deserved attention from Indian policymakers.
Water Institutional Structure: A Macro Perspective
For a more focused treatment, our review of the
structure of formal and macro-level water
institutions is organized within the analytical
framework based on institutional decomposition.
This framework distinguishes three institutional
components, i.e., water law, water policy, and
water administration, and highlights a few key
institutional aspects under each of these three
components.
17 The ensuing review concentrates
only on these key institutional aspects under
each of the three institutional components.
Water Law
Water law assumes a central place in the
functioning of water institutions as it gives the full
legal backing to water policy as well as
providing the operational framework and
enforcing power for water administration
including its regulatory arrangements. Although
India does not have any separate and exclusive
water law, there are water-related legal
provisions dispersed across various irrigation
acts, central and state laws, constitutional
provisions, court decisions, customary laws, and
various penal and criminal procedure codes.
18
Besides the irrigation and groundwater-related
laws with a direct effect on water resources
development, allocation, and use, there are also
legal provisions with indirect but significant
effects on the water sector. These provisions
are those associated with other water-related
natural resources such as land, forest, and10
environment.
19 As most of the water-related legal
provisions enacted in the past were characterized
by water surplus conditions, they fail to reflect
the current conditions of water scarcity and water
conflicts. Although there were some periodic,
though marginal, changes in some of these
provisions related to irrigation, especially during
the post-independence period, they are too
inadequate to develop a legal system capable of
meeting the emerging challenges within the water
sector.
Inter-governmental Responsibility
The legal provisions related to inter-governmental
responsibility in the water sector are derived from
the overall constitutional division of power
between the central and state governments as
effected by the Indian Constitution of 1952.
20 As
per the Entry 17 in the State List under the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, it is the
states that have jurisdiction over water resources
within their borders. But, the powers of the states
are subject to Entry 56 in the Union List that
allows the central government to regulate and
develop inter-state rivers and river valleys when
this is declared by parliament as a matter of
public interest. The central government also has
regulatory roles in the water sector vide Article
252 related to inter-state water projects as well
as in terms of the Forest Conservation Act of
1980, which requires the states to get central
clearance for executing ecologically sensitive
water projects.
More importantly, the central government
also has an important role in resolving inter-state
water disputes as per the provisions under Article
262. It is in pursuance of this Article that the
parliament has enacted the Inter-state Water
Disputes Act of 1956 and it is under this act that
a number of tribunals were set up to resolve
water disputes among the states.
21 Besides, the
centre can also acquire legislative powers on
water when two or more states desiring to have
uniform water legislations request the union
government with the approval of their respective
assembly (Jacob and Singh 1972). Despite these
legal provisions as well as other administrative
and financial leverages (that we will see later) of
the central government, the final legislative
powers are still with the states in the sense that
constitutionally speaking, water-related laws can
be passed only by or with the support of the
state legislature. While this arrangement is good
to address state-specific concerns, there are
also serious problems with the present
constitutional division of power in the water
sector that does not allow the central
government to have a more proactive role in
water matters. As a result, the central
government is unable to provide the kind of
leadership and guidance needed for reforming
the legal and institutional basis of the water
sector, both at the national and state levels.
19The categorization of laws in terms of their direct and indirect effect on water is somewhat artificial considering the powerful effects that
forest laws have on water resources development. For instance, as we will see below, the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 places major
limits on the development of new as well as the extension of old water resources development projects in ecologically sensitive areas. Similarly,
civil and penal codes designed to prevent third party effects in water use, though directly related to water use, are ineffective as they are
costly to enforce.
20This constitutional division of power creates three lists of sectors/activities/jurisdictions. These are the Union List where the central government
has exclusive power [Article 246(1)], the State List where the state governments have exclusive powers [Article 246(2)], and the concurrent
list where both the central and state governments exercise powers [Article 246(3)].
21Since the Act has failed to specify the authority to implement the decision as well as the time limit for tribunal decision, it was amended
twice—first in 1980 for authorizing the central government to establish the implementation authority and then, in 2002 to specify a six-year
time limit for tribunal decision (Salman 2002; Richards and Singh 2002).11
Water Rights
The issue of water rights as a mechanism for
allocation and accountability assumes importance
with increasing scarcity and conflicts both at the
macro level of regions and sectors as well as at
the micro level of distributaries, communities, and
individual users. Unfortunately, India does not
have any explicit legal framework specifying
water rights, even though various acts have a
basis for defining some form of such rights.
British legislation in India during 1859-1877
recognized the customary water rights of
individuals and groups. But, a radical shift
occurred with the Easement Act of 1882 that
made all rivers and lakes the absolute right of
the state.
22 While state’s absolute rights can
affect the development and managerial aspects
of water, from the perspective of water use, it is
the de facto control over water by actual users at
the micro level that is more important.
Individual rights to both surface water and
groundwater are recognized only indirectly
through land rights. Thanks to the ‘dominant
heritage’ principle implied in the Transfer of
Property Act IV of 1882 and the Land Acquisition
Act of 1894, a land owner can have a right to
groundwater as it is considered an easement
connected to the dominant heritage, i.e., land.
23
In the case of canal water, the rights to access
are limited only to those having access to land in
canal command areas and these rights are only
use rights and not ownership rights because
irrigation acts, in the case of all states in India,
do not allow the moving of canal water to non-
canal areas.
24 Under conditions of unequal land
ownership and income pattern, the practice of
linking water indirectly with land and the fact of
de facto control by better endowed persons only
accentuates rural inequality and water use
inefficiency.
The Model Groundwater (Control and
Regulation) Bill of 1992, which was formulated
and circulated by the centre for the consideration
of the states, postulates a kind of groundwater
permit system. However, it fails to set withdrawal
limits (GOI 1992a). While the Bill did induce
some legal initiatives in states like Karnataka,
Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu, it has not received
any serious consideration by other states, even
though the Bill was circulated again among the
states in 1997. In view of the absence of any
significant reform initiatives, the legal aspects
governing groundwater resources continue to
remain largely divorced from both resource
realities and economic requirements (Jain 1976).
Thus, the control over groundwater at the field
level is governed by a de facto system of rights
as determined by farm size, the depth and
number of wells, pumping capacity, and
economic power.
Accountability Provisions and Mechanisms
The two-way accountability, i.e., the individuals’
accountability to each other and to the state, and
vice versa could not be operationalized until a
legal rights system is defined in the first place
(Singh 1992:8). When law defines individual
water rights, in effect, it defines not only the legal
22This position gotconsolidated further with the Madhya Pradesh Irrigation Act of 1931 and also influenced subsequent irrigation and water
supply acts enacted even in the post-independence period. But, a number of public interest litigations have led both the Madras High Court in
1936 and the Bombay High Court in 1979 to declare that the government’s sovereign rights do not amount to absolute rights (Singh 1991).
23As we will see later, this provision not only constrains groundwater markets, which have emerged spontaneously in many parts of India,
where water is sold apart from land but also legally excludes those without land to have any access to groundwater.
24However, this provision is either violated or bypassed in many states. For instance, in the canal schemes of Vidisha district in Madhya
Pradesh, it is common for non-command area farmers to lift water from canals with diesel pumps. While similar instances are also observed
in Periyar-Vaigai canal commands on a limited scale, the dominant practice in many canal regions of Tamil Nadu is not to move canal water
directly but indirectly by lifting groundwater in canal regions and moving it to non-canal regions. Some of these informal water transfer schemes
are very elaborate and extend up to 10 km. Notably, some of these schemes are financed by nationalized banks operating in rural areas.12
boundaries but also the physical and economic
boundaries of each individual’s acts and their
effects on others in the context of water use. By
relating rights with duties, such boundaries could
be legally handled with a reasonable
quantification. Thus, the individual-based water
rights system helps to trace externalities, assign
payment responsibilities, minimize inter-personal
conflicts, and achieve the legally grounded notion
of two-way accountability. Equally important is
also the issue of accountability of executives and
officials to the state and to the people. As most
irrigation and water-related acts in India have
indemnity clauses to protect the executives
against the consequences of wrong or non-
implementation of stated policies, they do not
provide enough incentives for the executives to
be accountable either to the state or to the
people.
The accountability of users is sought to be
influenced by negative but indirect provisions
evident in penal codes and other civil/criminal
procedures (Singh 1991). While some of these
provisions can be used to penalize users for acts
such as non-payment of water charges or illegal
water diversions, there are no corresponding
provisions for penalizing officials for their failure
to supply water at the right time or in the
required quantity.
25 Although legal provisions are
necessary to infuse accountability and
responsibility, they are not sufficient as their
operational effectiveness depends on the kind of
accountability mechanisms postulated within
water laws. The accountability mechanisms
currently available are both formal such as the
statutory, legislative, and judiciary-based
mechanisms as well as informal such as the
decentralized, people-oriented mechanisms (Devi
1992). Of them, while the formal mechanisms are
costly in terms of both money and time, the
informal mechanisms such as water user
associations (WUAs) and stakeholder-based
basin organizations—being more accessible and
responsive—could ensure accountability and




Water policy relates to the declared statements
as well as the intended approaches of the central
and state governments for water-resource
planning, development, allocation, and
management. It includes statements not only on
the overall policy framework but also on specific
policy issues such as project selection, water
pricing and cost recovery, and user and private
participation. Notably, since both the general and
specific policies within the water sector are also
influenced often by other sectoral policies related
to agriculture, public finance, and basic needs,
the former cannot be dealt in isolation of the
latter. For instance, the need for attaining food
self-sufficiency and consolidating the productivity
gains from the Green Revolution has led to the
implementation of large irrigation projects, rural
electrification programs, liberal credit policies,
and heavy irrigation, power, and credit subsidies.
Moreover, political considerations, macro-
economic necessities, and environmental
concerns including natural calamities (e.g., floods
25The poor recovery of water charges and illegal uses of water observed widely in many parts of India clearly suggest that these provisions
against users are ineffective because they are seldom used for political and practical reasons.
26While a user-managed water rights system is ideal for inducing efficient water use, promoting accountability, and resolving conflict, many
would agree that its creation is not an easy task in the Indian context. The existence of many small farms, poor conveyance structures,
political risks in creating the legal and organizational apparatus, and conceptual/information problems in defining water rights in physical and
legal terms are the frequently cited challenges. The issue of how to overcome these problems by building on the existing institutional potential
and micro level experiments—e.g., Warabandi (time-based allocation), Shejpali (water distribution roaster), and Pani Panchayat (water council)
systems—is dealt in detail elsewhere (see Saleth 1994a and 1996). If the introduction of a water rights system can improve use efficiency
just by 10 percent in the irrigation sector, from a national perspective, this will mean an addition of 8.9 mha of irrigated area without any new
water development projects. Such a simple calculation suggests that the benefits of creating the water rights system can outweigh the cost
of transacting this institutional change.13
and drought) also have a strong influence on
water sector policies.
National Water Policy
Although the need for a national-level policy for
the water sector was felt for quite some time, the
immediate factor that prompted the National
Water Policy (NWP) of 1987 was the
unprecedented drought of 1987. The main goals
of NWP are the promotion of conjunctive use of
water from surface and sub-surface sources,
supplemental irrigation, and water-conserving
crop pattern and irrigation and production
technologies (GOI 1987). It has called for raising
the canal water rates and promoting user
participation in canal management. While the
diagnosis of the NWP is right, its prescriptions
fail to address the serious economic and
institutional vacuum within which the water sector
is operating. Although the NWP has recognized
the need to limit individual and collective water
withdrawals, it has failed to identify the
institutional mechanisms necessary for defining
and enforcing such physical limits. Unfortunately,
the new NWP declared in 2002—being almost a
repeat of its earlier version—has also failed to
address the major economic and institutional
issues. But, this policy is still significant because
of its explicit recognition of the role of private
sector participation and the need for a paradigm
shift from water development to performance
improvement (GOI 2002). On similar lines,
several states (e.g., Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar
Pradesh) have also come out with their own
water policy statements displaying the same
flaws evident in their national-level counterpart.
27
Project Selection Criteria
During the pre-Independence period, since the
British treated irrigation projects as largely a
commercial proposition, project selection policy
was based on the Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
criterion.
28 However, during the latter part of
colonial administration, project selection criteria
were relaxed with the distinction of projects in
terms of their productive and protective
character. IRR guided productive irrigation
projects, where irrigation was provided
throughout the year except during the canal
closure period. Simple cost-based considerations
guided protective irrigation projects, where
irrigation was confined to a single season or to
times of need. After Independence, there was a
further shift in approach. Instead of a dominant
commercial approach, irrigation projects were
viewed as instruments for fostering
socioeconomic development, especially by
augmenting income, employment, and food
production. Consequently, the IRR, which was
initially lowered to 3.9 percent in 1949, was
altogether abandoned in 1958 and in its place, a
rather liberal benefit-cost ratio (BCR) was used
as the project selection criterion. While the
Gadgil Committee of 1964 recommended a BCR
of 1.5, the Irrigation Commission of 1972 (GOI
1972) allowed a BCR of just 1 for projects in
drought-prone areas. However, in 1983, following
the suggestion of the Public Accounts
Committee, the BCR was replaced by the IRR as
the project selection criterion and the accepted
IRR was 7 percent for projects in drought-prone
and water-scarce areas and 9 percent for others.
Admittedly, the reinstatement of the IRR is
welcome. But, the minimum levels stipulated are
far lower than the prevailing interest rate of about
27Let us also recognize that a mere declaration of policies may not mean much unless they are implemented to realize their impact at the field
level. However, from the perspective of the long process of institutional change, the declaration of policy statements do signify a beginning of
the change process.
28The actually used IRR was also based on the prevailing rate of interest in the London money market as irrigation investments were often
made from borrowed funds. As a result, the IRR was also periodically revised, i.e., from 4 percent till 1919 to 5 percent during 1919-1921 and
to 6 percent after 1921 (Sangal 1991).14
10 percent. Besides, there are also cases where
this project selection criterion was seldom applied
or its requirements were compromised. As a
result, although there were clear policies for
project selection, they are not strictly applied for
various political and socioeconomic reasons.
Cost Recovery Policy
As to the cost recovery policy in the context of
irrigation projects, successive Finance
Commissions since the Fifth one have insisted
on the recovery of not only the full operation and
maintenance (O&M) expenses but also a
proportion of the interest on irrigation investment.
While the Fifth Finance Commission suggested
this proportion to be 2.5 percent, the two
subsequent Finance Commissions have lowered
this to just one percent. Although the Eighth and
Ninth Finance Commissions were satisfied with
just the recovery of the O&M costs, the Tenth
Finance Commission reverted back to the stance
of the Sixth and Seventh Finance Commissions,
i.e., the recovery of full O&M costs plus one
percent capital costs. This kind of cost recovery
policy has also been supported by the Irrigation
Commission in 1972 and the Jakhade Committee
in 1987. The Committee on Pricing Irrigation
Water in 1992 went a step further in
recommending the recovery of not only the full
O&M costs and one percent capital cost but also
a percentage of the depreciation cost.
29
Unfortunately, the recovery policy, despite its
widespread approval, was never implemented, as
it involves not only an upward revision in water
rates but also a radical change in the very
method for determining them.
Water-Pricing Policy
While poor financial performance led to the
recognition of the need for revising water rates,
political pressure led to a delay in their
implementation. The main reason why farmers
resist higher water rates is the general perception
of water as a public good. But, the 1972 Irrigation
Commission has articulated, for the first time
since independence, the private good
characteristics of canal water. The Commission
has also suggested that water rates have to be
revised to cover, at least, 5 percent of gross
income in the case of food crops and 12 percent
in the case of commercial crops (GOI 1972).
Despite the recommendation of this and several
subsequent commissions and committees, the
water charges actually recovered from farmers
continue to form only a fraction of both the water
productivity (i.e., the difference between the
productivity levels of irrigated and rainfed lands)
and the actual O&M costs.
30
While the cost recovery role of water pricing
policy was emphasized by many expert groups
and statutory committees, the Jakhade
Committee of 1987 has underlined the resource
use efficiency function of water pricing policy.
The Committee has suggested that if the
method and level of water rates are such as to
capture and convey the scarcity value of the
resource, they can both induce efficiency and
ensure full cost recovery at the same time.
Although many states (e.g., Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu)
have recently revised water rates up to three
times, the present level and the method of fixing
water rates is still unable to play these dual
29Although the 1992 committee suggested a larger cost recovery than its past counterparts, the recommendation is far short of full cost recovery,
partly because of the interest and depreciation rates are far below the market rates and partly because of the underestimation of the O&M
and replacement costs. The latter occurs due to historical underinvestment in actual O&M, which, in turn, contributes to higher replacement
cost.
30Recovered water charges, as a proportion of O&M costs, vary from 4.02 percent in Uttar Pradesh to 73.33 percent in Orissa whereas the
same proportion of water productivity varies from 0.28 percent in West Bengal to 5.19 percent in Maharashtra (GOI 1992b).15
roles. These dual roles cannot be expected
unless water pricing policy forms part of an
institutional and technical arrangement needed
for facilitating volumetric distribution, group-based
allocation, and local management (GOI 1992b;
Saleth 1996).
31 This institutional basis of water
pricing policy is now recognized not only in
current literature (e.g., Nagaraj 1999; Dinar and
Saleth 2004) but also in actual reform programs
(e.g., Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu).
User Participation and Privatization
The policy towards user participation in irrigation
management has evolved since 1974 when the
Command Area Development (CAD) program
was initiated to hasten the utilization of the
created irrigation potential through farmers’
cooperation. Additional efforts to mobilize farmers
in canal areas were also made in the 1980s
under the National Water Resource Management
project funded by the World Bank. User
participation under the CAD program was
ephemeral and ineffective due to ad hoc
attempts and the paternalistic attitude of the
bureaucracy. But, the financial crisis and physical
deterioration of the irrigation systems have forced
the irrigation agencies to consider farmer groups
as indispensable partners in irrigation
management. As a result, farmers’ role in outlet
level water allocation, fee collection, and system
maintenance was recognized and the policy of
‘turning-over’ the system below the outlet level
was accepted in principle and also practiced with
varying degrees of success (see Vermillion 1997;
Brewer et al. 1999). But, the major change in the
user participation policy occurred with the large-
scale turn-over program of canal irrigation
systems in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya
Pradesh. To facilitate this, these states have also
amended their irrigation laws by passing special
acts. In many new and upcoming projects such
as the Narmada and Sardar Sarovar projects, it
is categorically specified that water will be
distributed only to organized WUAs.
32
The attention on private sector participation
in the water sector has been an outcome of
factors such as declining irrigation investment,
poor financial performance of water projects, and
the privatization of public sector enterprises
initiated since the New Economic Policy of 1991.
In 1995, the Union Ministry of Water Resources
has constituted a high level committee to look
into the legal, economic, and technical questions
related to the privatization of public irrigation
projects. This committee has submitted a report
favoring a gradual, selective, and stage-wise
process of privatization of the irrigation sector
(GOI 1995). Similarly, the state government of
Madhya Pradesh constituted a committee to look
into the issue of sharing the primary benefits
(water supply) and secondary benefits (power
generation, tourism, aquaculture, and horticulture)
between the government and the private parties
involved in project construction and management.
This committee has recommended that the
primary benefits should be retained by the
government but the secondary benefits can be
given to private investors (GOI 1995:135).
33 The
NWP of 2002, as approved by all states, has, in
31Volumetric allocation is not new as it was tried twice—in 1854 and in 1917 in the Ganga Canal—during the British period. Although the idea
was abandoned because of its impracticality under the technology of that time, it has received periodic attention even during the post-
independence period, especially since the Taxation Enquiry Committee of 1953. Conveyance structures conducive for volumetric allocation
have also been established in recent projects such as Majalgaon Scheme in Maharashtra.
32In practice, however, this organizational requirement for water distribution has often been compromised either due to the lethargy of irrigation
authorities or due to the pressures from influential local individuals and groups.
33The terms of benefits offered by Maharashtra are still better as the government has allowed also a 6 percent share in total storage in addition
to the full rights on all the secondary benefits (Saleth 1997).16
fact, encouraged the reliance on the private
corporate sector as a potential partner for water
resources development and management.
Water Administration
Water administration covers the organizational,
financial, and managerial structures including the
regulatory apparatus and conflict resolution
mechanisms, which are directly connected to the
water sector. Despite considerable variations in
the name and structure of water administration
across states, there are a few common features
such as centralized and bureaucratic character,
dispersed organizational responsibilities, and
weak functional linkages. Some of these shared
traits become apparent as we review the overall
structure of water administration both at the
national and state levels.
Organizational Framework
The general organizational framework of the
Indian water sector can be briefly described by
highlighting the key actors playing different roles
both at the centre and in the states. The Union
Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR), which
itself evolved from the erstwhile Department of
Irrigation under the Union Ministry of Agriculture,
is the national organization that is responsible for
the overall planning and management of the
water resources in the country. The Central
Water Commission (CWC), the Central
Groundwater Board, and the National Water
Development Agency—all under the MOWR—
provide the overall technical support whereas
the research and training support is provided by
organizations such as the Water and Land
Management Institutes (the name differs in
some states), agricultural universities, and other
research institutions. The Planning Commission
at the national level provides project clearance
and approves financial allocation to various
water projects in different states. Other central
agencies influencing the water sector, in one
way or the other, include the ministries of
agriculture, environment and forests, and
housing and urban development.
34
As noted already, the actual legislative and
managerial responsibilities are with the public
works, irrigation, or water resource departments
at the state level. Usually, there are different
departments to handle the groundwater and
surface water sectors in the case of most
states. The main department handling the water
sector also has its own research and training
facilities in some states. There are also
important organizational arrangements to
achieve inter-state and centre-state
coordination. These include not only various
river boards charged with the responsibility of
coordinating water allocation among the
concerned states in the context of few
important inter-state rivers
35 but also the
National Water Resources Council (NWRC) set
up in 1983 and the National Water Board
(NWB) set up in 1990.
36 The NWRC is an
34Understandably, the project approval and clearing process is not free from the political economy process. As a result, this process is not as
effective as it is expected to be. However, in recent years, environmental activists, public interest litigants, and even donor agencies are
beginning to exert considerable moral, legal, and financial pressures to improve the effectiveness of the process.
35Since these river boards, which were created under the River Boards Act of 1956, are bureaucratic arrangements—they are not to be confused
with the stakeholder-based river basin organizations that are being advocated in recent years.
36The NWRC had only four meeting so far and the NWB had 11 meetings including a special meeting in 1994. The items discussed in the last
meeting of the NWRC, for instance, include a water information bill, policy note on river basin organization, national policy on resettlement
and rehabilitation, change in water allocation priorities, and approach to organizational changes in irrigation sector. Given the political nature
of NWRC, its decisions on most issues remain inconclusive. However, the NWP of 2002 was passed unanimously after important compromises
on inter-state water allocation issues. Given its composition, although NWB is less political, it is not completely free from the political process.
For instance, the draft national policy guidelines for water allocation among states being considered since the special meeting of NWB in
1994 was considered as finalized for submission to NWRC only in 1997. But, this issue is still in the agenda for the next meeting of NWRC,
the date of which is not yet certain.17
important policy organ in the Indian water sector
as it is the apex body chaired by the Prime
Minister and includes the Union Minister of Water
Resources and the chief ministers and the
lieutenant governors of all states and union
territories. The NWB—considered as the
executive arm of NWRC—is chaired by the
secretary of the MOWR and includes the chief
secretaries of all the states/union territories,
secretaries of the concerned union ministries as
well as the Chairman of CWC. Although the state
government (and, to some extent, the central
government under few special drinking water-
related programs) have a dominant role, local
governments such as municipalities and
panchayat (village council) unions also play an
important role in drinking water supply. Donor
agencies such as the World Bank actually try to
enhance their role in urban and rural water
projects as part of their strategy for
decentralization. Similarly, while irrigation
departments have a larger role in the provision
and management of irrigation, users and
stakeholder groups are also encouraged to get
involved in cost recovery and management at the
outlet and system levels. Pollution control boards
operating usually under the ministry of
environment and forests both at the centre and
in the states have the responsibility for water
quality aspects.
Financing and Management
Since water is a state subject, it is the states
that are responsible for financing, cost recovery,
and management of all irrigation and water-
supply-related activities within their territory. They
finance water development schemes from their
own revenue, their share from the centrally
collected revenue proceeds, and borrowings from
financial institutions both within and outside the
country. In recent years, some states such as
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh are
also trying to mobilize funds from the private
corporate sector as well as from the general
public through deep-discount water bonds. As the
cost recovery from irrigation and water supply
projects is low and declining, many states are
likely to rely more and more on such private and
public sources of funds. Even though the states
have the major responsibility for water sector
financing, the centre also plays a significant role
by providing finances to states through central
assistance, undertaking the construction of
projects of national importance, and implementing
centrally sponsored schemes such as the CAD
program in canal regions. Besides, the central
government also facilitates, approves, and
allocates external loans and aid to irrigation and
other water supply schemes through the
concerned organs including the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Planning Commission.
Although the central government is
responsible for overall planning and coordination,
the states are responsible for the actual
management of the water sector. The state water
administration—known variously as the Irrigation
Department, the Public Works Department, and
the Water Resources Department in different
states—is responsible for the construction,
maintenance, and management of water projects.
Regarding water pricing and cost recovery, the
administrative systems differ in different states
partly due to historical reasons.
37 Water
administration in many states also has diffused
or unclear administrative and functional
responsibilities inapt for developing an integrated
approach to water management. Since water
management responsibilities are often held by
37For instance, in Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, the water rate assessment is done by the water-related department
whereas the collection is done by the revenue department. But, in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa and Tamil Nadu, both functions
are performed by the revenue department. This administrative problem is due to the fact that in the case of most old irrigation projects in
these states, there are no separate water charges, but only a higher land revenue assessment for irrigated lands.18
ministries dealing with public works, internal
transport, or public health, they are lumped
together with activities such as road construction
and port management. But, the activities that are
to be aligned such as surface water and
groundwater management and irrigation and
water supply provision are dispersed across
departments or ministries. This problem is
addressed only partially by the recent
organizational reforms in states such as Andhra
Pradesh, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, Madhya
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (World Bank 1998).
Despite the organizational reforms to the
contrary, the spatial structure of water
administration in most states is still based on
administrative boundaries and projects rather
than on any well defined hydro-geological
boundaries.
Regulatory Mechanisms
While India has a relatively sound technical
information base and expertise in water-related
aspects, their utility at the practical level of
regulation is extremely limited due to the lack of
organizational arrangements for enforcement and
monitoring. The top-down approach inevitable in
any centralized administrative set up and the
attendant inability to tap locally available informal
institutional potential (e.g., water-related local
customs, water sharing conventions, and
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms)
constrain effective enforcement of even well-
conceived policies. While the well-spacing norm
prohibits new wells within a radius of 200 m in
most parts of India, the norm can be as high as
680 m in areas with deep tubewells and serious
depletion (Shah 1993). Similarly, there are also
depth restrictions, especially for deep tubewells.
For instance, in Gujarat, as per the Bombay
Irrigation (Gujarat Amendment) Act of 1976
(1979), tubewell depth was limited to 45 m,
particularly for the Mehsana region. Later, the
limit was not only raised to 100 m but also
made applicable to most parts of Gujarat. Since
these spacing and depth restrictions take effect
only when a farmer applies for concessional
loan/well permit/electric connection, they restrict
mostly the poor farmers (Dhawan 1990).
While a restricted power supply policy
provides some regulatory respite, it is of little
consequence in the face of large pumps and
multiple wells. The effectiveness of regulations
based on power tariff and supply policies is
severely undermined not only by the availability
of the diesel pumpset option but also by the
presence of a ‘kink’ in the power demand curve
of farmers.
38 Although groundwater markets are
found to improve efficiency and equity in water
use (Shah 1993), they could, nevertheless,
accentuate aquifer depletion under current legal
and institutional regimes without water rights
(i.e., legalized ‘water quotas’) (see Saleth 1996).
Thus, current legal and regulatory policies as
well as these markets reinforce rather than
regulate the de facto control of groundwater by
resource-rich and influential farmers. In the case
of surface water resources, neither the usual
policies based on water charge/supply
manipulation nor the new ones based on
rotational water supply are likely to generate
sufficient impact effective enough to enforce
discipline in canal water use. WUAs can
certainly enhance cost recovery and improve
system maintenance. However, they cannot
generate incentives powerful enough to enhance
water use efficiency unless they operate within
the framework of a legally established but locally
38The kink in power demand emerges from the gap between energy cost and the net value of output per unit of power. As long as this gap is
substantial and can also be manipulated by crop choice, farmers will not reduce power consumption and hence, their power demand will be
insensitive to power tariff changes (Saleth 1997).19




Various arrangements exist for resolving conflicts
at different levels. Water use prioritization
specified in the NWP and implied in the
constitution
40 can provide a general framework for
resolving inter-sectoral water allocation conflicts.
But, for a more effective solution, quantification
of entitlements has to accompany prioritization
and both should be defined within appropriate
hydro-geological and organizational contexts.
Unfortunately, the issue of quantification of
entitlements is often left to administrative or
political decisions. The most preferred
arrangement requires the physical context of river
basins and the organizational context involving
stakeholder networks. In the case of inter-state
(or inter-regional) water conflicts, the frequently
relied on arrangement in the past involves
negotiated agreements for developing/sharing
water among the concerned states/regions.
41 But,
when there is difficulty in reaching a negotiated
settlement, the concerned parties can rely on the
tribunal established by the central government
under the provisions of the Inter-state Water
Disputes Act of 1956.
42
As the pressure for the renegotiation of
existing agreements builds up with increasing
water scarcity, the role of the tribunal mechanism
is likely to increase in the future. Although the
tribunal settles disputes by quantifying water
claims, it involves a lengthy process to reach a
final settlement. Even the six-year time limit
specified by the 2002 amendment is too long
given the urgency and gravity of disputes in
some cases.
43 Besides, since the implementation
of tribunal awards can be contested in the
Supreme Court, it is crucial to provide legal
binding to final awards. Although market or
negotiation-based arrangements are not tried
much in India, there is considerable potential for
them. States can be encouraged to purchase
and sell water either on a payment basis or on a
barter basis (i.e., exchange of water for power or
foodgrains). There are also cases such as the
Krishna water transfer for Chennai (Madras) city
where Tamil Nadu has paid for the entire project
cost (implicitly paying for water).
As to the mechanisms for resolving water-
related conflicts at the micro level, there are a
few traditional and informal village-level
institutions (e.g., tank-level organizations in Tamil
Nadu). By rejuvenating these informal institutions
as well as by strengthening the formal
arrangements such as the panchayat institutions
39Clearly, the need and urgency of such a water rights system are directly related to the transaction cost implications of water scarcity, water
use inefficiency, and water conflicts. Thus, such a system may not be needed in water surplus regions. But, even here, if individualized water
rights can be created with less cost, they can provide incentives and serve as an instrument to encourage water development and use. It is
precisely for this reason that an officially granted non-transferable long-term individual water lease system was introduced in the deltaic regions
of Orissa and West Bengal as well as in parts of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh—all known for water underutilization (GOI 1976:65).
40For instance, the constitutional provisions relating to fundamental rights to life (and clean environment) are often used as a basis for assigning
top priority for drinking and domestic uses as well as irrigation and ecological water needs.
41There are about 58 independent water-related agreements among states concluded in the past—39 related to joint projects and 19 related
to sharing of river waters—and all of these are under heavy pressure for renegotiation due to the increasing water requirements of concerned
parties.
42Under this act, the central government has so far set up five tribunals and the three of them have come out with amicable decisions (Krishna
in 1976, Godavari in 1979, and Narmada in 1979). Iyer (1999) provides a critical evaluation of the working of these three treaties. In the case
of the tribunal dealing with the politically-sensitive Cauvery River dispute, there is only an interim award and this is strongly contested by one
of the concerned states.
43For instance, in the case of Cauvery basin, the inability of Karnataka to deliver the required volume of water (due to rainfall failure in catchment
areas) has caused serious disturbances to rice cultivation in most parts of the Cauvery delta in Tamil Nadu during the past several crop
seasons. Such crop loss and farmers’ unrest, and the brewing political animosity between the two states with its implications for the stability
of the national government indicates what the magnitude of the economic loss and political damages could be, if the tribunal decision process
continues over a six-year period. In such conditions, the time frame for tribunal decisions should not be more than two years.20
and WUAs, it is possible to build more effective
and accessible conflict resolution mechanisms at
the grassroots level. However, the middle level
conflicts across communities within a river basin
or canal system (e.g., upstream users vs.
downstream users or head-end users vs. tail-end
users) as well as the conflicts between irrigation
and water supply agencies are still rampant for
want of proper forums for resolving differences.
The arrangements forming part of the
bureaucracy (e.g., divisional engineer or district
collector) not only remain inaccessible for all but
also turn out to be artificial as free expression of
mutual concerns becomes difficult. A basin or
system-level stakeholders’ association involving
user groups and officials can be a very useful
forum for promoting both conflict resolution and
accountability.
Water Institutional Structure: Micro Perspective
Although colonial policies as well as the post-
colonial expansion of the government
bureaucracy have severely eroded most of the
indigenous water institutions, India still has a rich
variety of locally managed water-related
institutions, especially in water-scarce areas in
Bihar, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Himachal
Pradesh (Datye and Patil 1987; Sengupta 1993).
These institutions are in the form of informal
customs and conventions for water sharing as
well as community-based organizations for water
management. Although these institutions remain
largely independent of formal water institutions
and operate only at the periphery of the formal
water sector, they can still provide very valuable
insights for designing the kind of institutional
mechanisms that are needed for filling the
organizational vacuum existing at lower echelons
of water management. In addition to these
traditional arrangements, new forms of informal
arrangements for sharing water and irrigation
service have also emerged in recent years,
especially in the groundwater regions. They are
the rental markets for irrigation assets,
groundwater markets, and myriad forms of water
contracts. As these informal institutions—both the
traditional and the emergent ones—have
significant implications for the operation and
performance of formal institutions, they deserve
our attention.
Localized Institutions
Despite the fact that the legal system in India
has not formally specified any water rights
system, there are evidences for the operation of
rudimentary water rights systems capable of
being developed into an effective water rights
system. Informal water rights—both for
individuals and groups—have existed in India
since ancient times (Siddiqui 1992) and continue
even today, albeit in a much weaker form, in
many tank irrigation systems of South India (Vani
1992). Some of the South Indian irrigation
systems have informal and prioritised water rights
not for individuals, but for different distributaries
or command segments (Vaidyanathan 1985:63-
64). The 200-year old Phad system operating in
the Panijhra River area of the Dhule district and
the the Pani Panchayat (water council) system
being practised in parts of Purandhar taluk of
Pune district, Maharashtra (Datye and Patil
1987:42-123; Thakur and Pattnaik 2002) have21
the potential for creating a user-managed water
rights system.
44 There are also a variety of other
forms of cooperatively-operated and community-
managed irrigation activities ranging from lift
irrigation schemes in canal and groundwater
areas to water harvesting and sharing
arrangements in arid and mountain areas.
Although these are well documented in existing
literature (e.g., Datye and Patil 1987; Sengupta
1993; Singh and Bhallab 1996), their social and
organizational potential for developing
decentralized and locally-managed water rights
systems are yet to be evaluated.
In the deltaic regions of Orissa and West
Bengal as well as in parts of Bihar and Madhya
Pradesh, there exists an officially-granted non-
transferable long-term water lease system
designed for encouraging farmers to use surface
water (GOI 1976:65). More important and
interesting is the Shejpali (water distribution
roster) system being practised in the canal
commands of western Maharashtra. Although this
system is not enforced to the extent that it
should have been, it shows the prevailing
institutional potential for developing a form of
water rights in the canal region. Under this
system, the canal authorities issue ‘water passes’
on the basis of an application from farmers in the
command on a ‘first-come, first-served’ basis.
The duration of these water passes varies from
six years to a single crop season and their
priority varies somewhat directly with their
duration (Gandhi 1981; Rath and Mitra 1989).
Except for their non-transferability and
quantitative specification, these water passes
system closely resembles the water permit
system practised in the mid-western states of the
United States.
Rental Markets for Irrigation Assets
Over-investment on private irrigation assets (i.e.,
wells and pumpsets) by some farmers and non/
under-investment on the same by others due to
land, water and capital-related snags led to the
emergence of the phenomenon of rental markets
for irrigation assets. Since these markets allow
farmers to irrigate their farms by renting the
irrigation assets from neighbors, they contribute
both to equity in water use and better utilization
of irrigation assets. According to national sample
survey information (NSSO 1984 and 1985), about
10 percent of the total pumpsets in the country
are involved in pumpset rentals. Since about 63
percent of these rentals occur with dugwells/
tubewells with electrically powered and
permanently fitted pumps, it seems that the
majority of the rentals involve water transfers as
well. This is particularly so in the Indo-Gangetic
and hardrock states. Since the rest of the rentals
occur in the case of other water sources where
pumps can be physically moved with little cost, it
seems they occur independently of water
transfers. This is particularly so in the deltaic
states such as Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal
(Saleth and Thangaraj 1993).
The expanding phenomenon of pumpset
rentals is an indication of the existence of
surplus pumping capacity, particularly in the case
of diesel pumpsets. In conditions where irrigation
assets account for 16 percent of rural assets and
up to 40 percent of private fixed capital formation
in agriculture (Saleth and Thangaraj 1993), the
underutilization of irrigation assets is a serious
issue. The informal institution of rental markets
has emerged essentially as a response of the
farmers to address this problem. This
44Notably, under the Pani Panchayat system, the water share of users is based not on farm size but on water needs. Since water needs are
calculated at about half an acre worth of irrigation per person, the allocation criterion is divorced from land ownership, but linked closely with
family size (Singh 1991:35; Vani 1992:9-10).22
phenomenon also brings forth certain conceptual
and institutional implications. For instance, when
there is the physical movement of pumpsets from
one water source or location to another, they are
just pure pumpset rentals as there is no water
transfer between farms.
45 But, in the hardrock
and Indo-Gangetic regions where pumpsets—
mostly electricity-based—are permanently
installed with dugwells/tubewells, pumpset rentals
necessarily involve water transfers and hence,
the rental activity is institutionally linked with
groundwater markets (Saleth 1994b). Since
NSSO data allows distinguishing pumpset rentals
by electric and diesel power, it is possible
evaluate the extent of the institutional linkages
between pumpset rentals and groundwater
markets. In view of the fundamental linkages
between groundwater markets and rental
markets, the expansion of groundwater markets
in recent years also indicates a similar expansion
of—either explicit or implicit—rental markets
as well.
Groundwater Markets
Despite their localized, fragmented, and uneven
nature across regions, groundwater markets are
growing in magnitude and gaining in significance.
While water selling practices in India are traced
to the 1920s, more systematic documentation of
this phenomenon started only since the late
1960s. Their characteristic features are that they
occur without any formal water rights system and
involve no sacrifice of self-irrigation.
46 While there
is no systematic national-level study on the
magnitude of water selling, based on his studies
in Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh, Shah (1993:250)
has projected the area irrigated through
groundwater markets to be up to 50 percent of
the total gross irrigated area under private lift
irrigation. Understandably, there are
considerable variations across regions. While
the area irrigated through groundwater markets
is projected to be up to 80 percent for north
Gujarat (Shah 1993:205), the corresponding
figure for Uttar Pradesh is about 60 percent
(Shankar 1992:12). But, in Vaigai basin, Tamil
Nadu, the area under purchased water was
reckoned at no more than 30 percent of the
total irrigated area (Janakarajan 1993). In
contrast, there are also studies which report no
water selling at all in their respective sample
areas (see Shah 1993:55). Considering such
regional variations and the potential bias in
area/sample selection in most studies, it is
more reasonable to consider the area under the
influence of groundwater markets to be about 6
mha, representing just 15 percent of the total
area under groundwater irrigation.
47
Coming to the dominant technical and
institutional features of water markets, although
their geographic locus is limited by the physical
characteristics of groundwater aquifers and
farming systems, their size is often enlarged by
elaborate underground pipeline networks. But,
such market expansion is confined to very few
regions and often leads to an unbalanced
market structure as it adds more buyers than
sellers to the market. Since buyers are mostly
45In their survey of few West Bengal villages, Kolavalli and Atheeq (1990:26) report such pure pumpset rentals where diesel pumpsets are
leased on a seasonal basis with the lease rate per crop season varying between Rs 1,200 and Rs 1,500.
46Under these conditions, there is not only a conceptual issue (i.e., whether the sellers are selling water or excess pumping capacity) but also
an economic question (i.e., the opportunity costs are undefined when there is no sacrifice of self-irrigation).
47This estimate has the following conceptual and empirical basis. Given the conceptual and institutional linkages between pumpset rentals
and water selling, pumps being rented also involve water selling. In the case of dugwells and deep tubwells with electric and diesel pumps
located in the hardrock and Indo-Gangetic regions, such water selling naturally involves groundwater. Given this fact and assuming that the
extent of rentals observed by NSSO during 1976-1977 has doubled by now, about 20 percent of the 14.2 million pumps operating at present
(i.e., close to 3 million pumps) can be expected to be involved in rental activities. Further, assuming that each of these pumps irrigates, on an
average, 2 ha, the total area that is under the so called groundwater market can be about 6 mha. This can represent no more than about 15
percent of the total area under groundwater irrigation at present. For more details on the procedure, see Saleth (1998: 190).23
small farmers, they have a weak bargaining
position. For instance, a typical water sale-
purchase matrix in Uttar Pradesh reveals that the
demand side is dominated by smaller farms with
less than 2 acres as they account for 81 percent
of the total area under purchased water (Shankar
1992:33). In view of the monopolistic or
oligopolistic tendencies in these markets, not only
are the water rates several times higher than the
pumping cost but also the price and non-price
discriminations remain pervasive. The root cause
for the sub-optimality of these groundwater
markets lies not so much in their economic and
organizational aspects but in the legal and
institutional vacuum within which they operate at
present. As a legally-instituted and locally-
managed water quota system defined within an
ecologically consistent overall withdrawal limit
can provide more powerful incentives for water
use efficiency, it could eliminate their negative
effects while magnifying their positive benefits.
The challenges, potentials, and opportunities for
creating such a water rights system are
discussed in detail elsewhere (Saleth 1994a and
1996).
Water-Based Contracts and Other
Local Institutions
There are a variety of water-based tenancy
contracts. Although these contracts are often
treated as part of groundwater markets, they
need to be differentiated as they involve the use
of other resources such as land, labor, capital,
and other farm inputs that are governed by
distinct sets of other institutions. For instance,
there are two distinct types of such contracts in
Kheda district, Gujarat. They are: (a) a two-party
contract where water sellers provide irrigation,
share 50 percent of cash expenses (except labor
costs), and claim 50 percent of output and (b) a
three-party contract where water seller, land
owner, and laborer share equally the cash
expenses as well as crop output (Shah 1993:51-
52). Similarly, in Karimnagar district, Andhra
Pradesh, water sales occur as a part of different
contractual arrangements such as labor
contracts, crop sharing contracts, and crop and
input sharing contracts. These contracts
represent not only an institutional evolution of
crop sharing within the context of groundwater
markets but also link these markets with other
rural input/output markets.
Apart from these water-based tenancy
contracts, the pricing methods are also
accompanied by certain informal conventions and
contractual obligations with considerable
implications for water use efficiency and risk-
sharing (see Kolavalli and Atheeq 1990:38-40).
For instance, although the area-based method
involving crop shares provides lesser incentive
for water conservation than the method involving
hourly rates, it allows risk-sharing between
buyers and sellers. It also involves some informal
contractual obligation for sellers to provide
irrigation for the whole season. Besides, in the
case of both the area and per irrigation rates,
there are also mutually agreed upon conventions
(e.g., the level or intensity of irrigation
constituting ‘full irrigation’) to avoid conflicts and
water over use. Since water sharing contracts
also lead to input selling/output selling contracts,
there are also evidences for inter-linked input and
output markets in rural areas (Janakarajan 1993).
Thus, as the groundwater markets mature, they
are getting more and more linked with other rural
institutions.
To complete our discussion on the nature
and operation of micro-level institutions, it is
necessary to recognize many community and
non-governmental initiatives in local-level water
development, sharing, and management,
especially in surface irrigation areas both in canal
areas as well is in other ecologically fragile areas
in dry and mountain zones. Some of them are
spontaneous in nature—emerging from collective
action by community groups and others have
emerged through the efforts of community and
non-governmental groups, including donor24
agencies. These initiatives include water user
organizations in few of the canal, lift, and tank
schemes, community organizations in water
sharing arrangements in mountain and desert
regions, and Pani Panchayat and Phad system in
part of Maharashtra. Most of these local-level
water institutional arrangements are also well
documented (e.g., Palanisamy and Easter 1983;
Datye and Patil 1987; Sengupta 1993; Singh and
Bhallab 1996; and Thakur and Pattnaik 2002).
Although the area benefiting from these local
initiatives is only a tiny fraction of the total area
under irrigation, they are crucial for providing
social and organizational models for similar
initiatives elsewhere and even, for large-scale
macro-level institutional arrangements. As these
initiatives occur at the micro level essentially, as
a response to local-level water-related
challenges, they are largely divorced from
institutional changes at the macro level. This
does not mean, however, that they are entirely
free from national and regional level legal, policy
and organizational arrangements, as these
arrangements do, in fact, serve as part of their
institutional environment (Ostrom 1990). As a
result, they can be promoted with appropriate
legal and policy changes that are favorable to
their functioning, success, and replication.
48See Saleth and Dinar (2004) for an exposition of the theoretical justification of this approach and its empirical application using subjective
and judgmental information from 127 water experts from 34 countries around the world. This study also can also provide valuable insights on
how this approach can be used to measure the potential or expected performance of even the newly created institutions such as basin
organizations and water banks.
Evaluating the Performance of Water Institutions
The overall performance of water institutions
depends not only on the individual effectiveness
of the legal, policy and organizational
components and their underlying institutional
aspects but also on the joint performance as
determined by the strength of the structural and
functional linkages among these institutional
components and aspects. Besides these internal
and structural features, the performance of water
institutions depends also on the general
institutional environment within which they evolve
and operate. While this perspective of evaluating
water institutional performance is consistent with
our institutional decomposition-based analytical
framework, its empirical translation with objective
information presents a major challenge.
Nevertheless, this approach is amenable for
empirical application when it is possible to use
perception-based judgmental information
collected from a carefully selected sample
representing a cross-section of water sector
stakeholders.
48
When perception-based data cannot be
collected due to the lack of time and resources,
the alternative could be the reliance on the
learned and balanced judgments of the
researchers themselves. The key aspect for
consideration in this respect can be the overall
progressiveness of water institutions as captured
in terms of their adaptive capacity, amenability
for innovation, openness for change, and ability
to tackle emerging and future water sector
challenges (Saleth and Dinar 1999). As we
reflect on these criteria over our brief description
of the structure of Indian water institutions both
at the micro and macro levels, we can derive a
few general and qualitative results. For instance,
we can see that micro-level institutions (e.g.,25
groundwater markets) are relatively more
responsive to changing local needs whereas
macro-level institutions continue to lack the
required extent of flexibility as changes are
resisted by factors ranging from path dependency
to political economy obstacles. Even within
formal institutional components, water policy is
relatively more responsive as compared to
water law and water administration. Since the
policy changes (e.g., water policy statements
by national and a few state governments) are
more in the nature of declaration of intentions
or expression of aspirations rather than as
attempts at practical implementation, they are
politically easy to accomplish but operationally
unable to deliver the intended economic
benefits. But, policies related to more
substantive aspects such as water pricing and
inter-regional water transfers have not
changed much. Similarly, in the sphere of
water administration, changes such as
administrative reorganizations are mostly
superficial, whereas substantive aspects such as
the oversized and functionally unbalanced
staffing pattern, creation of basin organizations,
and making water-related departments financially
autonomous have not changed much.
From another perspective, water sector
performance can also be used as a proxy for an
indirect evaluation of water institutional
performance. While the performance criteria
applicable at the project and system levels are
relatively more rigorous (e.g., Bos 1997; Burt and
Styles 1997), those needed for evaluating the
performance of water sector as a whole are
more indicative rather than conclusive.
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Recognizing this fact, we follow a simple yet
meaningful approach of evaluating the overall
performance of the Indian water sector in terms
of three gaps: the physical gap, financial gap,
and economic/incentive gap (Saleth 1996).
50 The
physical gap can be evaluated both in terms of
the gap between the water-resource potential
and its utilization as well as in terms of the gap
between water demand and supply.
51 The
financial gap can be indicated in terms of the
gap between water sector investment and cost
recovery. Similarly, the economic/incentive gap
can be reckoned in terms of the gap between the
average value of water and the water rate being
charged. Finally, while the physical gap is
obviously evaluated for the water sector as a
whole, the other two gaps are evaluated here
only in the context of the irrigation sub-sector
that uses up to 80 percent of total water
withdrawals in India.
The utilization gap is already indicated in an
earlier section as part of our discussion on the
water institutional environment. The demand-
supply gap that has already assumed serious
proportions in local and regional contexts (e.g.,
Cauvery Basin, in southern India) is also growing
at the aggregate level. In the particular context of
the irrigation sub-sector, the demand gap is very
serious as the actual irrigation potential created
so far is only about 88 mha as against the gross
sown area of 185 mha.
52 The problem is going to
be complicated further by the declining share of
irrigation caused by the increasing demand
pressures from other water sub-sectors. From
49Even with well-developed objective performance criteria, water sector performance cannot be evaluated in all its dimensions due to the
presence of crucial subjective and qualitative aspects of performance such as the smoothness of water transfers and the adaptive ability of
water institutions. While proxies like the number of water conflicts can be used to capture this aspect, it is not clear, for instance, how one
can factor in the evaluation aspect such as the relative seriousness of such conflicts.
50The underlying goals of the three performance criteria are respectively the physical and economic sustainability of the resource system,
financial viability of the water sector, and the economic efficiency of resource use.
51Since the first gap indicates the physical sustainability of the resource system and the second one captures the economic sustainability of
the water sector, these gaps together suggest the sustainability performance of the water system in a given context.
52Even if the estimated ultimate irrigation potential of 139 mha is fully developed, India will still continue to have this irrigation gap as the
gross sown area is expected to grow further to 210 mha by 2025.26
the perspective of institutional performance, what
all these forms of physical gaps suggest is the
fact that current institutions, particularly those
related to inter-basin transfers, inter-sectoral
allocations, and conflict resolution, are too weak
to fill these gaps.
The financial gap in the water sector can be
approximated by the difference between the total
investment costs and total revenue in the canal
irrigation sector. The total investment in canal
irrigation during 1951-2000 is estimated to be Rs
790 billion at current prices (MOWR 2000). Even
if we assume a simple rate of 8 percent to
account for both interest and depreciation, the
annual financial cost of canal irrigation provision
comes to about Rs 63 billion. Although we do not
have published information on the revenue from
the canal sector, going by the estimate of the
Committee on Pricing Irrigation water (GOI
1992b), we can reckon that the total revenue at
present can be in the range of about Rs 3-5
billion. Such a huge financial gap clearly shows
that the institutional aspects such as cost
recovery and water pricing policies as well as the
organizational mechanisms involved in water-
charge collection are performing rather poorly.
Since the economic/incentive gap shows
the extent that water charges remain below
the economic value of water, it is clearly linked
with the financial gap—especially water pricing
and cost recovery policies. Water rates are not
only very low but are also rarely revised,
except in a few states, that too, only recently.
As a result, they are related neither to
productivity nor to provision cost. They cover
hardly 5 percent of water productivity and 8
percent of O&M costs. Paradoxically, since the
low water charges are not even fully
recovered, the arrears are also accumulating
over time in most states. Besides these effects
on the financial side, low and uneconomic
water rates also lead to an incentive problem
causing widespread water use inefficiency. The
incentive gap can be approximated by the gap
among water productivity, supply cost, and
water rates. In the context of canal regions,
water productivity is reckoned in the range of
Rs 714–5,812/ha and supply cost is estimated
to be in the range of Rs 90–603/ha. But, water
rates are in the range of Rs 6–1,000/ha (GOI
1992b). The incentive gap indicates not just
the poor performance of pricing and cost
recovery policies but also the absence of
institutional conditions necessary for volumetric
allocation such as water rights including their
legal and organizational requirements.
Institutional Change: Nature, Extent, and Causes
The review of water institutional structure clearly
shows that legislative powers, technical
capabilities, planning skills, and operational
responsibilities are dispersed across
government layers. As a result, water
institutions in India remain legally weak,
functionally disjoint, and regionally
uncoordinated. While the physical stress,
financial crisis, and performance gaps have
clearly exposed the legal, policy, and
administrative weaknesses of the water sector,
myopic political issues and administrative
resistance continue to delay the implementation
of the reform blueprint developed jointly by the
GOI and the World Bank (World Bank 1998).
Fortunately, this does not mean that there are
no changes in the institutional sphere both at
the central and state levels.27
Nature and Extent of Changes
At the national level, the central government has
constituted a number of national committees/
commissions to review specific water policy
issues as well as plan for a long-term
development of the water sector. Among them,
the notable ones are the Committee on Pricing
Irrigation Water (1992), Committee on Private
Sector Participation in Major and Medium
Irrigation Projects (1995), and the National
Commission of Integrated water Resources
Development Plan (1997). While the first one has
revived the attention on the rationalization of
water rates, volumetric water allocation, and
system modification, the second one has
documented the rationale, feasibility, and actual
state level initiatives for involving the private
corporate sector, especially in the construction
and modernization of irrigation schemes. The
national commission has developed a national
master plan for the water sector by synthesizing
and updating similar plans prepared earlier by the
CWC as well as investigated the economic,
technical, and institutional issues in the water
sector from a national perspective.
Although these three initiatives seem to be
like any other routine committees/commissions,
they are very important as parts of the long
process of water-sector reforms in India. In fact,
some of their suggestions are reflected in the
new NWP declared in 2002 with the consensus
and approval of all states. It is true that the
finally approved version is a substantially
watered-down version of the draft of 1999 in view
of the reservations expressed by few states,
especially on statements related to water sharing.
But, it does signify a consensus on two important
policy issues that represent a somewhat radical
departure from the past. These relate to the
agreement on private sector participation in water
resource development and on the need for a
paradigmatic shift from water resources
development to their allocation and
management.
53 Besides the new NWP, there are
also notable changes on the legal front—some
initiated by the central government and others by
public interest litigations by concerned individuals/
groups. To avoid the usual delay in tribunal
decisions, the Inter-state Water Disputes Act of
1956 was amended in 2002 to specify a six-year
limit for giving the final award. The Cauvery River
Water Authority has been created to deal with
the allocation conflict among the basin states.
54
While public interest litigations have invoked the
Supreme Court to order the closer/relocation of
many polluting industries on the banks of
Yamuna and Ganges rivers, presidential
intervention has invoked the same to order the
central government to investigate the feasibility of
linking major rivers.
55
At the state level, there are also noteworthy
changes, especially in the case of Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh.
These changes can be seen both in the
53It is necessary to qualify the ‘consensus’ that is being alluded to here, as these policy changes including the NWP of 2002 were brought
about by the policy-makers and experts groups at the macro level without any public consultation with the participation of user groups and
non-government bodies.
54This entity—patterned after the Murray-Darling River Basin Organization of Australia—is unique in the Indian context as this is the first time
that a basin organization is chaired by the Prime Minister with the chief ministers of all the concerned states as members.
55This inter-basin transfer scheme—popularly known as the ‘Garland Scheme’—has been proposed for a longtime not just by engineers and
politicians but even by poets and other social thinkers. This scheme plans to connect 37 Himalayan and peninsular rivers through 30 links,
3,000 storages, and 12,500 km of canals. While this gigantic water grid that is expected to handle 178 billion m
3 of inter-basin water transfer
will cost US$120 billion, it will add 35 giga watts of power and 35 mha of irrigated area. In fact, the NWDA has also been systematically
investigating the feasibility of linking various rivers in the country for quite some time. The feasibility reports—covering both the socio-economic,
environmental, and hydro-geological impacts—related to some of the segments of the inter-linking scheme are already available and others
are being now prepared by NWDA through various research and technical institutions in India. Yet, this scheme is not beyond controversy
given the legal thrusts, financial costs, political obstacles, and environmental consequences (see Iye, 2002). Clearly, this scheme makes it
inevitable for the country to make sensitive decisions and tradeoffs.28
organizational spheres (e.g., administrative
reorganizations including the creation of basin
organizations in states such as Tamil Nadu and
Uttar Pradesh) as well as in the policy spheres
(e.g., declaration of water policy statements by
most states).
56 There are also more substantive
changes in a few states. For instance, Andhra
Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have gone for a
statewide program for the transfer of the
management responsibilities of almost all canal
irrigation below the outlet and minor levels.
57
Notably, such transfers occurred with the full
legal backing under specifically enacted
legislations. With the transfer of irrigation
management responsibilities and the organization
of regular elections and functional training to the
office-bearers of WUAs, these states could also
see their farmers accepting an increase in water
charges up to three times and undertaking cost
recovery and maintenance functions below the
outlet level.
58 Although irrigation management
transfers in other states are not of the magnitude
observed in these two states, they do indicate
both policy commitments and concrete actions
for the devolution of allocation, cost recovery,
and maintenance functions to WUAs (Joshi and
Hooja 2000; Hooja et al. 2002). Admittedly, the
progress in these states is obviously much
slower. Even in states such as Andhra Pradesh
and Madhya Pradesh, the effects are seen more
in terms of cost recovery and system
improvement rather than in terms of water
allocation decisions and water use efficiency.
Other important changes at the state levels
include the creation of autonomous corporations
by Karnataka and Maharashtra for mobilizing
public funds as well as the initiatives of Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and
Maharashtra for soliciting corporate investments
in the water sector. In 1994, Karnataka formed
the Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Limited (KBJNL)
under the Companies Act with the specific
purpose of mobilizing public funds for developing
the Upper Krishna Project. Thanks to the high
return (about 17.5 percent) and government
guarantee, the water bonds issued by the KBJNL
during 1995-1999 have fetched an unexpected
sum of Rs 23 billion.
59 Almost similar is the case
with the Maharashtra Krishna Valley
Development Corporation (MKVDC) floated by
Maharashtra in 1996. The water bonds of
MKVDC also promise a 17.5 percent return
payable half-yearly with a maturity period of six
years for the first 50 percent of the value and
seven years for the remaining 50 percent of the
value. Besides, these bonds also allow an up-
front discount of 2.5 percent of their face value.
As a result, the first public issue of MKVDC
undertaken in July 1996 has fetched an amount
of Rs 4.28 billion as against the original target of
Rs 1.5 billion. Encouraged by such an
overwhelming response, the Maharashtra
56It would be rather naïve to believe that the mere creation of basin organizations or the declaration of water policies would be sufficient
enough to have an immediate impact on water sector performance. But, at the same time, from the perspective of institutional change as a
long and sequential process, these initiatives do remain significant, as they create some of the necessary conditions for initiating additional
changes in the institutional structure and an eventual improvement in water sector management and performance.
57For instance, under its Farmers’ Participation in Irrigation Management Act of 1999, Madhya Pradesh has transferred outlet management
responsibilities of all surface irrigation schemes to 1470 legally constituted and formally elected WUAs—466 in major, 158 in medium, and
846 in minor schemes.
58In the case Andhra Pradesh, the recent elections for WUAs have been postponed. Also, there were a series of amendments to the Farmers’
Participation in Irrigation Management Act that have reinstated some of the powers back to the irrigation department. These factors are creating
the impression that the reform process is gradually getting reversed.
59Since a high credit rating of these bonds has led to over-subscription, the KBJNL has revised down the return to 14.25 percent in July 1998.
But, the fact remains that in real term, even this lowered rate is still high given the declining bank interest rates. More importantly, there is
also the looming doubt as to the long-term ability of the KBJNL and MKVDC both to servicing and to repay the amount collected through
these bonds. Much depends on whether such a financial burden will create pressure for improving their commercial viability and financial
performance.29
government has plans to mobilize over Rs 36
billion through MKVDC (Saleth 1999).
In addition to its efforts through MKVDC, the
government of Maharashtra is also trying to tap
direct investment from the private corporate
sector. For instance, in 1996, it has invited
private bids for 52 irrigation projects worth Rs
150 billion. Along similar lines, the governments
of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Madhya
Pradesh have also tried to tap the private sector
both for the construction and modernization of a
few water projects (GOI 1995). Interestingly, in
its Agricultural Policy Resolution of 1995, the
Government of Karnataka (GOK) has indicated
its willingness to grant financial autonomy to the
irrigation department by converting it into a
corporation and making the farmers co-owners of
the irrigation structure with ‘water equity shares’
(GOK 1995).
60 Finally, for completeness, let us
also state that the changes in the informal
institutions at the grassroots level are substantial.
These changes are induced by both macro-level
changes (e.g., irrigation management transfer) as
well as the micro-level changes in conventions
and contractual arrangements (e.g., irrigation
assets and water sharing conventions).
Explaining Changes within a
Transaction Cost Perspective
The observed changes within the institutional
transaction cost framework outlined earlier, reveal
some interesting insights into the role and
relative significance of various factors motivating
these changes in the Indian context. The
socioeconomic consequences of widespread
groundwater depletion, ecological costs of large-
scale water development projects, storage loss
from siltation, and command area loss to water
logging and salinity have remained fundamental
factors providing a strong economic motivation
for water institutional reforms. Unfortunately,
the financial and performance crises of the
water sector have failed to gather the political
economy thrust needed for prompting concrete
actions. From an institutional transaction cost
perspective, what this means is the fact that
although the opportunity costs of inaction were
high, the perceived political costs of taking
actions were still high enough to undermine
the reform initiatives.
Fortunately, there were a number of
developments—mostly exogenous to the water
sector—since the mid-1970s that have not
only reduced the political costs but also
magnified the opportunity costs of water
institutional reforms. For instance, the earlier
practice of making water policy subservient to
the food self-sufficiency policy has lost its
relevance when India eliminated food imports
in 1971 and started building a comfortable
buffer stock (often going beyond 20 million
tons in recent years). Although the first NWP
was prompted by the water-related
phenomenon of the widespread drought of
1987, it is the political and media fallout
associated with this natural event that, in fact,
galvanized the necessary political will to
declare even such a simple non-binding policy
statement. But, the transaction cost calculus
with respect to water institutional reform
changed rather dramatically with the macro-
economic crisis of the late 1980s and the
subsequent declaration of the New Economic
Policy of 1991 focusing on financial discipline,
economic liberalization, and liquidation of
public sector enterprises.
The major impact of the New Economic
Policy on the water sector has been a radical
decline in its budgetary share. For instance,
the share of the irrigation sector alone has
declined from 23 percent of total planned
expenditure in the 1950s to 7 percent in
60The other states where this sort of change is more likely to take place in the near future are: Haryana, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu (Gulati
and Meinzen-Dick 1996).30
recent years. In the wake of such budgetary
cuts, water-related departments were forced to
take a harder look into ways of cost saving and
fund raising within the sector itself. At the same
time, farm lobbies that were resisting water rate
revision have also realized that farm income is
getting increasingly affected by unreliable water
supply from poorly maintained irrigation systems.
It is these macro-economic conditions and their
micro-economic consequences that have
magnified the opportunity costs of reforms from
the perspective of both the government and
water users. The situation, therefore, has
become favorable to revise water rates, involve
farmers in cost recovery and system
maintenance, and consider broader water-sector
reforms. It is in this particular environment
characterized by economy-wide reforms that the
central government constituted the committees to
look into issues such as water pricing and
private-sector participation and the state
governments went for options such as
autonomous corporations and private-sector
participation.
61 It is naïve to expect that these
changes will have an immediate and
straightforward impact. However, they are
certainly complementing the micro-level changes
such as the IMT and also paving the way for
further institutional changes downstream (e.g.,
the proposal to compensate farmers for non-
delivery of water made by the Planning
Commission).
The revival of interest on many policies that
were considered once as anathema or
impractical (e.g., irrigation privatization,
volumetric water allocation, water rights, and
moving water into the concurrent list) indicates
the changing balance in the policy debate. This is
certainly a positive development and augurs well
for the prospects of more substantive reforms in
the future. From another perspective, the
economic and trade liberalization policies initiated
since 1991 have also produced significant scale
economies in terms of their synergetic effects on
water sector reforms. Since water-sector reforms
form part of an economy-wide reform, the
political economy costs of the former became a
small proportion of the latter.
62 Meanwhile,
international lending agencies (e.g., World Bank
and Asian Development Bank) and research and
technical organizations, e.g., International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) and Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) also have
considerable influence on the nature and
direction of water sector reforms. For instance,
most of the organizational reforms, including the
promotion of basin-based organizations observed
in states such as Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu,
Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh, were introduced
under different World Bank-funded projects.
Similarly, the IMT processes in Andhra Pradesh
and Madhya Pradesh were shaped, to a greater
extent, by previous research on the incentive
aspects of matching grants as well as on the
organizational aspects of multi-tiered
arrangements for linking water user groups.
The transaction cost and political economy-
based explanations apply not only to the general
institutional changes observed at the macro level
but also to the specific institutional changes
occurring at the state and local levels. For
instance, groundwater markets have emerged as
the private costs of their creation/emergence are
lower than their private benefits to individual
farmers. This does not mean that they are free
from social costs such as the implicit/illegal sales
of power, violation of the proportional sharing
principle, and aquifer depletion (Saleth 1994b).
61These changes in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra also have an ulterior motive as they use these unconventional
means of financing water projects so as to establish their control over water resources in the Krishna basin before the tribunal award comes
for renegotiation.
62This fact clearly underlines the transaction cost implications and strategic significance of timing and packaging the water-sector reform so
as to make it coincide with and form part of a larger economy-wide reform program.31
But, these costs have not entered into the
transaction cost calculus because they are
perceived by the state to be lower than the
economic and political costs of creating the
institutions necessary for regulating them.
But, this reckoning cannot remain this way for
long as the transaction cost calculus of
groundwater markets may get reversed with new
developments. We also note, while passing, that
all the water-related local conventions and
contracts that we have discussed earlier are also
amenable for transaction cost-based
explanations, though the calculus in these cases
involves mostly private costs and benefits.
Certainly, the net social costs of groundwater
markets in terms of depletion effects and
ecological and equity consequences are far
higher than the net private benefits, especially in
the hydro-geologically sensitive areas. Yet, these
markets escape regulation because both the
economic costs of creating an effective
regulatory regime as well as the political costs of
undertaking such regulation are still higher in the
reckoning of the policy groups and political
leaders.
The irrigation management transfer program
implemented both in Andhra Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh also has a perfect explanation
within our institutional transaction cost
framework. While there are committed change
agents on all sides—the state, bureaucracy,
donors, research/training organizations, and the
people, the actual forces for change have their
origin in the changing political-economy realities
of these states. The heavy fiscal burden of
irrigation subsidy has convinced the state, the
bureaucracy, and the donors of the need for
transferring the irrigation system to farmer
groups. The economic threats of an increasing
productivity loss from the poorly-maintained
irrigation system—documented well by research
organizations
63 and personally experienced often
by farmers—have convinced them of the key role
that farmers, as a group, have to play in
improving farm-productivity and system efficiency.
Though it is seldom recognized explicitly, the
political groups have also viewed the program as
an opportunity to build their grassroots
organizations and local groups found them as an
additional avenue for assuming social status and
power. Since the program is viewed as a logical
part of the process of decentralization centered
on the panchayat system (particularly in Madhya
Pradesh), it is also perceived to have
considerable political mileage for ruling parties,
especially during the election years.
64 Thus, from
the perspective of all stakeholders, the
transaction costs were reckoned to be far lower
than the opportunity costs (i.e., the foregone
potential benefits) of not implementing this
program in the particular institutional environment
which characterized these states when the
program was actually implemented.
While the Indian water sector is gradually
coming out of the bureaucratic grip and myopic
political considerations, it has not yet fully
matured to be influenced mainly by economic
and technical forces. Unfortunately, the divisive
role of political factors is likely to increase,
especially on the issue of inter-state water
sharing, as most rivers in India are shared by
two or more states. As the basin resources are
fully appropriated, additional claims will be
politically more acrimonious unless institutional
arrangements are created to catalyze negotiated
settlements and mutual agreements. But, the
issue has become complicated by the proposed
‘Garland Scheme’ for linking rivers, especially
63International best practices and research-based knowledge produced by organizations such as IWMI have also played a catalytic role in
reducing the transaction costs of irrigation management transfer programs, especially in Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.
64The irrigation-management program in Madhya Pradesh was quicker and smoother than in Andhra Pradesh in view of the facilitative role of
the decentralization process that was implemented before the transfer program. This is evidence for the advantage of sequencing two different
but operationally related reform components in terms of the favorable effects of the earlier program on the transaction costs (especially its
implementation cost component) of the latter program.32
when the central government lacks the legal
powers and political will to implement the
scheme, though it has the technical and
financial arrangements to complete most of the
feasibility studies for various links. It is in this
political vacuum and indecisive environment
that the Supreme Court has been invoked to
ask the government to report on the feasibility
and prospects of this scheme. This legal
injunction has, in fact, reduced the political
transaction costs for the scheme, which is one
of the long-term but somewhat tricky options
for India to address its water-shortage
problems.
65
65The issue of whether this Scheme is sensible on economic, environmental, and political terms requires a separate and exclusive analysis.
Neither the present occasion nor the space here is appropriate to do justice for such an analysis.
Concluding Remarks
Based on the Institutional Analysis and
Development framework and the Institutional
Transaction Cost theory, this paper has
developed a new research paradigm and
methodological framework useful for a strategic
analysis of the structure, performance, and
change in water institutions. This research
paradigm underlines the strategic roles that
factors both internal and external to the water
sector and water institutions play in minimizing
transaction costs and maximizing the prospects
for institutional reforms within the water sector.
Understandably, the nature and importance of
these factors can vary by the level of analysis
(macro and micro), water sources (groundwater
and surface water), or water sub-sectors
(irrigation and urban/rural water supply). Similarly,
the relevant transaction costs, the groups
reckoning these costs, and the groups
undertaking the changes can all change
considerably by context. However, the basic
framework proposed in this paper can be
generalizable with suitable adjustments to a wide
variety of contexts and situations.
Despite our selective and eclectic review of
the Indian water institutional structure and the
indirect and tentative way of evaluating its
performance, our attempt does leave a few
interesting observations with considerable
implications for both institutional economics
theory and water-sector-reform strategies. The
present structure of water institutions in India, as
reviewed in terms of some of their major
institutional components and aspects, shows that
it is far from the system that is required for the
country to meet its water challenges at present
and in the future. This observation is reinforced
further by the substandard performance of water
institutions, as evaluated indirectly in terms of the
overall physical, financial, and economic
performance of the water sector. However, there
are notable reform initiatives to strengthen the
water institutional structure and improve its
performance. These initiatives, undertaken
especially since 1991, provide observational
evidence for the fact that reform benefits (or,
opportunity costs of inaction) are exceeding the
corresponding economic and political transaction
costs. But, the fact that institutional changes are
uniform neither across institutional components
nor across water sub-sectors suggests that both
the opportunity and transaction costs vary across
institutional and sectoral contexts.
The nature, extent, and coverage of
institutional reform clearly provide evidence for
the powerful effects that exogenous factors (e.g.,33
economic liberalization policies, political forces,
international financial and research institutions,
and natural calamities) have on the opportunity
and transaction costs of institutional change
within the water sector. Notably, the initiatives
undertaken initially involved only the easier
transaction cost-wise and ceremonial options
(e.g., declaration of water policy, constituting
committees, and marginal legal amendments).
However, those undertaken in recent years
involved politically difficult and substantive
options (e.g., administrative reforms, basin
organizations, irrigation management transfer,
and reliance on autonomous corporations and the
private sector). But, India is yet to move to the
stage of embarking on real reforms (e.g., review
of centre-state relation in the water sector,
declaration of an exclusive water law, creation of
water rights system at various levels, and
administrative reforms for water sub-sectoral
coordination, staff resizing, and balanced
functional specialization). Understandably, these
reform options involve heavy economic and
political transactions costs. Although these costs
are lower than the potential performance
benefits, the differential weights assigned by
political leaders often distort the transaction cost
calculus.
While India has to go a long way to set right
its water institutional structure, from the
perspective of a stage-based process of
institutional change, the changes observed so far
do signify that India is on the threshold of
ushering in the substantive phase of institutional
reform.
66 This observation is based on four
reasons. First, although the observed changes
are slow, partial, and inadequate, their direction
and thrust are on desired lines. Second, the
nature and tenor of these changes—both already
observed and those proposed in an approved
reform blueprint (World Bank 1998)—indicate a
clear commitment of the central and state
governments to move ahead with the process of
institutional change. This commitment is likely to
be strengthened further by additional pressures
from factors both endogenous and exogenous to
the water sector. Third, as the already initiated
reforms begin to yield benefits, strengthen pro-
reform constituencies, and reduce the technical
and political costs of transacting additional
reforms, the incentive balance within the
institutional transaction cost framework is likely to
move toward further reforms. Finally, but, more
importantly, since the path dependency properties
of institutional change will ensure that it is
costlier to return rather than to go ahead in the
reform path, further reforms are more likely to be
undertaken. Although the reform process can be
delayed, it can neither be stopped nor reversed.
While the prospects for undertaking higher-
level reforms are brighter for India, there is an
indispensable need for a clear and long-term
strategy for reform implementation. In this
respect, some of the key insights from cross-
country analyses of water institutional reforms
(e.g., Saleth and Dinar 2000 and 2004) can be
used both for reform design and implementation.
These involve the issues of timing to strategically
exploit the synergy effects from exogenous
factors, scale-related effects of institutional inter-
linkages (e.g., links between WUAs and pricing
policy and WUAs and volumetric allocation), and
institutional sequencing and packaging (e.g.,
undertaking easier reforms first and implementing
related programs together). As the transaction
cost declines and political balance improves as
we move on the institutional change continuum, it
is prudent to pursue a logically linked sequential
66As per the theory of institutional change proposed by Saleth and Dinar (2004), the change process involves circularity with four distinct
stages, each with different dimensions of time and configuration of drivers. These stages are marked by mind change in terms of perceptional
convergence among stakeholders as induced by both objective and subjective factors, procedural and ceremonial changes, actual and
substantive changes, and the realization of actual performance benefits. From another perspective, the first stage is where the demand for
institutional change emerges, and the second and third stages are where the supply of institutional changes occurs.34
reform strategy wherein water sub-sectors and
institutional components are prioritized in terms
of their performance impact, facilitative roles for
downstream reforms, and political acceptability.
Since such a strategy can exploit better the
synergies from both institutional inter-linkages
and exogenous factors with proper timing,
packaging, and sequencing, it has a better
chance of success, that too, with the least social
cost and political opposition.35
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